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PRACTICAL EFFECT AND PREJUDICE TO
PLAINTIFFS: THE FAULTY VISION OF
SEC v. GRAYSTONE NASH, INC.'
INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
"in any criminal case" is, by its own terms, anomalous when
invoked in a civil case.' Although parties may invoke the priv-
ilege in civil cases when they fear criminal prosecution,2 the
"aims supporting the privilege simply apply less forcefully in
civil than in criminal cases."3 The less immediate and likely it
seems that authorities will use incriminating information in a
subsequent criminal proceeding, the less sanctity a court will
accord the self-incrimination privilege. The stakes are simply
higher for a criminal defendant. Unlike a civil adversary, the
government has one predominant interest, that of obtaining a
criminal conviction. The defendant may lose his freedom, not
just property.4 Thus, measures to ameliorate the prejudicial
* 25 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994) [hereinafter "Graystone M1], reug and remanding,
820 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993) [hereinafter "Graystone F].
' U.S. CONST. amend. V (in pertinent part, Onor shall [any percon] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself").
' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 316 (1976) ("(t]he Fifth Amendment 'not
only protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a witness against
himself in a criminal prosecution but also privileges him not to answer official
questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal,
where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings"' (quoting
Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973)).
' RAD Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 275 (3d Cir.
1986).
'Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19. The Court noted that the existence of "important
state interests other than conviction for crime" in Baxter was a factor counseling
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effects of an assertion of privilege may be inappropriate in a
criminal context, given the need to balance a defendant's liber-
ty interest against the prosecutor's paramount interest in crim-
inal conviction. In a civil action, however, such measures may
be appropriate and desirable in the absence of immediate crim-
inal jeopardy and the presence of other important goals on the
government's side.5
In a recent civil enforcement action case, SEC v. Graystone
Nash, Inc.,6 the Third Circuit broadly applied the self-incrimi-
nation privilege in a manner inappropriate to the civil context.
The court's holding was both inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent1 and inimical to the purposes and goals of the dis-
covery process.' The defendants in Graystone allegedly were
the principals in a massive securities fraud operation.9 During
discovery, both defendants prioritized their fear of criminal
prosecution and invoked the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion as their sole response to every substantive request."0 Af-
ter the close of discovery, the district court granted the SEC's
motion to preclude the defendants from offering any factual
support from any source for their denials and defenses in light
of the prejudice to the SEC stemming from this total avoidance
of discovery." The trial court then reviewed the evidence and
this lesser insulatory effect. Id. at 319.
6 See id. at 318-19; see also infra notes 195-200 and accompanying text.
25 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 1994).
See generally Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976). See also infra notes
25-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Baxter, limiting the usefulness of the fifth amendment privilege, and infra notes
31-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the line of cases precedent to and
following Baxter.
a See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the purpos-
es and goals of discovery.
' Graystone 11, 25 F.3d at 189.
10 Id.
" Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 869. The order in Graystone is a total preclu.
sion order in that it does not allow any factual support from any source to sup.
port denials and defenses on which the defendant has refused to provide discovery.
The scope of the order is total in light of the defendants' total avoidance of discov-
ery.
Preclusion orders also can be tailored where there is less than total avoidance
of discovery by allowing a defendant to provide factual support as to areas where
discovery has been had. Some courts have precluded the defendant's testimony but
have allowed other outside-discovered evidence to be used in support. This Com-
ment argues that this is inappropriate in situations of total avoidance of discovery.
See infra notes 212-14 and accompanying text.
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entered summary judgment for the SEC.'2
On appeal, the Third Circuit reasoned that such a preclu-
sion order was an inappropriate sanction because it rendered
the exercise of the privilege "costly," in contravention of the
Fifth Amendment. 3 The court drew this conclusion from its
finding that the practical effect of a total preclusion order is
equal to that of an entry of judgment for the opposing party. 4
Although the court outlined factors that the district court
should consider on remand when selecting a more appropriate
equitable remedy, it underestimated the prejudice accruing to
plaintiffs faced with a total avoidance of discovery.' In so do-
ing, the court focused not on what the SEC was deprived of by
defendants' invocation of the privilege, but on the amount of
evidence it possessed despite the invocation. 6
This Comment will maintain that in a civil matter such as
Graystone, where parties use the fifth amendment privilege to
avoid discovery, courts should issue a total preclusion order
disallowing any factual support from any source for any of the
defendant's denials and defenses. While there is some second-
ary support for the Third Circuit's view on the constitutionality
of total preclusion orders, 7 Supreme Court precedent does not
support a finding that total preclusion orders are unconstitu-
tional. Instead, the Constitution requires proscription only
where a final penalty or deprivation of rights occurs automati-
cally upon invocation, without intervening steps. 8 Moreover,
Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 876. Regarding the appropriateness of the or-
dered remedies, the court remarked that the evidence of defendant's wrongdoing
was "overwhelming" and that their "continued insistence that they did not violate
securities laws" was of "particular concern," id. at 875 n.14, and that "the problem
in this case is finding any activity that was lawfuL" Id. at 876.
" Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 190.91.
'4 Id. at 191.
"' Id, at 193-94.
16 Id.
17 Frances S. Fendler, Waive the Fifth or Lose the Case: Total Preclusion Or-
ders and the Civil Defendant's Dilemma, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1988)
('The practical effect of a total preclusion order is to award judgment to the civil
plaintiff on a mere showing of a prima fade case.").
1, See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-09 (1977) (striking
down a state statute that required an officer of a political party to either waive
the privilege or lose his office); see also Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 US. 70, 83-85
(1973) (declaring unconstitutional statutes that precluded award of government
contracts to any person who fails to waive immunity when called to testi* con-
cerning contracts with the state); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967)
1995]
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a more accurate estimate of the prejudice inherent in an invo-
cation of the privilege must take the broader goals and advan-
tages of full and mutual discovery into account. Courts should
focus on assessing what information the plaintiff was deprived
of, as opposed to that acquired despite the defendant's avoid-
ance of discovery. Courts should then take measures to effi-
ciently and completely counteract any advantage the defendant
may have gained.
This approach is preferable for a number of reasons relat-
ing to the raison d'etre for the privilege and the positive effects
of its narrow application in a civil context. The self-incrimina-
tion privilege should be a shield against criminal liability;
courts should compensate parties for incidental benefits accru-
ing to their adversaries who invoke the privilege in a civil
matter. Such court orders will enhance the functioning of both
the discovery and trial processes by prompting defendants to
make earlier assessments of the price of invocation when de-
ciding whether to assert the privilege and by helping courts to
determine the scope of an assertion. Total preclusion in cases
like Graystone enhances the fundamental search for truth in
civil litigation. Moreover, total preclusion is consistent with
Supreme Court holdings that narrowly construe the insulatory
effect of the privilege, and with the other important public and
opposition interests at stake in a civil case.
Part I of this Comment will sketch the contours of self-
incrimination jurisprudence, focusing on the line of Supreme
Court decisions that considered the use of the Fifth Amend-
ment in civil cases. This Part also will review the constitution-
al proscription against automatic deprivations and discuss the
basis of courts' power to remedy the resultant prejudice from
even a valid privilege invocation in a civil context. Part II will
present the factual background and procedural history of SEC
v. Graystone Nash, Inc. In Part III, this Comment will analyze
the Third Circuit opinion, counter the Third Circuit's refusal to
issue a total preclusion order, and advocate the use of appro-
priately tailored preclusion orders in cases of discovery stone-
walling.
Part III also more closely scrutinizes the character of the
(declaring unconstitutional the requirement that a police officer testify at an inter-
nal investigation or be fired).
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Graystone defendants and of this civil action, and points out a
lack of situational awareness on the part of the court. In this
regard, the Comment will maintain that the solicitousness for
these pro se defendants underlying the Third Circuit's opinion
was inappropriate. The facts of the case point to tactical ma-
nipulation by the defendants, not disability or neediness. Fur-
thermore, the court's misperception of the government plaintiff
as a monolithic, criminal prosecution-minded entity in this
civil context also led it to give undue deference to these defen-
dants. Finally, this Comment concludes that total preclusion
orders should be the rule in cases of total avoidance of civil dis-
covery.
I. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE IN
CIVIL CASES AND THE POWER OF COURTS TO REMEDY
PREJUDICE FROM INVOCATION AND WAIVER
A. "Nor Shall [Any Person] Be Compelled in Any Criminal
Case to Be a Witness Against Himself"9
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination
receives much more deferential treatment when invoked in a
criminal case than it does when invoked in a civil case. In a
criminal proceeding, the Supreme Court has definitively held
that to permit the fact-finder to draw any inference of guilt
from a defendant's refusal to testify under the protection of the
privilege is a violation of the Fifth Amendment. ' Equally im-
portant, the state2' may not compel self-incriminating testi-
mony from a person.' In connection with civil proceedings, in
U.S. CONST. amend. V (in pertinent part).
See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (court's and prosecutor's
comments on the defendant's failure to testify violated self.incrimination clause of
Fifth Amendment).
21 This includes both federal and state actors. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
6 (1964) (self-incrimination clause incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause).
Compulsion may take many forms, from judicial, see generally Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951) (criminal contempt threat to privilege invokers
unconstitutional), to physical or psychological, see generally Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (information gained from criminal suspect by interrogation




a line of cases culminating in Baxter v. Palmigiano, the Court
has held that the first of these rules is not applicable; an ad-
verse inference may be drawn in a civil context.' Further,
although protection against compulsion of testimony has re-
mained viable, the Court has implied that this protection does
not apply with the same force in civil cases as it does in crimi-
nal cases.'
In Baxter, Palmigiano, an inmate of the Rhode Island
Adult Correctional Institution, was summoned before a prison
Disciplinary Board for "inciting a disturbance and disruption of
prison operations, which might have resulted in a riot." In
this non-criminal proceeding, he invoked the privilege despite
the Board's warnings that the invocation could be used as
evidence against him. The Board subsequently used that infer-
ence and other evidence to impose disciplinary confinement.26
The Court framed the constitutional question in two ways:
whether the adverse inference drawn from his invocation was
repugnant to the Fifth Amendment; and whether the choice
itself was unconstitutional testimonial compulsion, in effect
making Palmigiano choose between waiving the privilege or
having disciplinary sanctions imposed.27 Regarding the first
contention, the Court enunciated "the prevailing rule that the
Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against
parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response
to probative evidence offered against them." This rule is in
direct opposition to the rule in criminal cases.29 As to the sec-
ond contention, although the Court reiterated that the privi-
lege still provides protection against compulsion of testimony
in non-criminal contexts," the Court construed "compulsion"
23 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); see also Deborah S. Bartel, Drawing Negative
Inferences Upon a Claim of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355
(1995).
24 For a good overview of the Fifth Amendment in general, and its invocation
in civil cases in particular, see Elkan Abramowitz & Jed S. Rakoff, The Fifth
Amendment Privilege in Civil Litigation: Assertion, Waiver, and Consequences, 137
CRIM. L. & URBAN PROBS. 211 (1985).
' Baxter, 425 U.S. at 312-13 (citations omitted).
2' Id. at 316-17.
27 Id. at 318-19.
2 Id. at 318.
2 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
"9 "Mhe Fifth Amendment not only protects the individual against being in-
voluntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also
[Vol. 61: 275
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narrowly.
In Baxter and in the Spevack-Garrity-Turley-Cunningham
line of cases,3' the Court articulated a test to determine when
unconstitutional compulsion has occurred. The question in
each case was whether a particular government mandate or
action was so "costly' that it unconstitutionally compelled
the defendant to waive the self-incrimination privilege.
These cases all involved situations where "refusal to submit to
interrogation and to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege,
standing alone and without regard to the other evidence, re-
sulted in loss of employment or opportunity to contract with
the state[, where] failure to respond to interrogation was treat-
ed as a final admission of guilt."' The defendants in these
cases faced choices between a waiver of the privilege or forfeit-
ing a job, disbarment, 6 cancellation of state contracts and
prohibition from doing state business in the future,"' or loss of
a political party office and a bar from holding political or pub-
lic office for a period of time.'
The Court has articulated a test to determine when uncon-
stitutional compulsion has occurred. The test, set out in
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, assesses the appropriateness of
actions taken by the government in civil cases by examnng
whether "refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege leads
automatically and without more to the imposition of sanc-
tions."9 For example, the Board action in Baxter was consti-
privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any official proceed-
ing, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate
him in future criminal proceedings." Baxter, 425 U.S. at 316.
31 Hereinafter referred to as the uSpevach line."
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967). "Costly," as used here, mandates
that a certain threshold level of compulsion exist prior to a finding of unconstitu-
tionality. See Graystone 1T, 25 F.3d at 19L
See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 US. 801, 803-04 (1977); Lefhowitz v.
Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 75-76 (1973); Specack, 385 U.S. at 512-13; Garity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497 (1967).
"Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497 (police officers told that they would be fired if they
did not testify in an internal investigation).
ISpevack, 385 US. at 512-13 (lawyer disbarred because he invokea the privi-
lege rather than testifying at a disciplinary proceeding).
' Turley, 414 U.S. at 75-76 (by operation of New York law).
- Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 803-04 (by operation of New York law).
"Id, at 808 n.5. In Baxter, a six-to-two majority favored the preceding views.
In dissent, Justice Brennan maintained that the adverse inference was imparmissi-
1995]
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tutionally permissible, as the production of other evidence
necessarily preceded the imposition of a penalty." Conversely,
in cases where the court found constitutionally infirm penal-
ties, the penalty directly and immediately followed invoca-
tion,41 "without more,"42 and as such was constitutionally
proscribed. In sum, the test focuses on whether refusal to
waive the privilege results in automatic deprivation of another
right or privilege. The Court forbade only those government
measures or actions taken in consequence of privilege that lead
ineluctably, without more, to penalty. This frees courts to use
equitable powers to take measures to redress harm to the
interests of civil parties caused by an adversary's assertion of
the privilege.
B. The Power of the Court to Compensate for Inequities
The purpose of broad pre-trial discovery of factual issues is
to promote "'a fair contest with the basic issues and facts dis-
closed to the fullest practicable extent." 3 Privileges hinder
the conduct of a fair contest by impairing the adverse party's
access to evidence, information reasonably calculated to lead to
evidence and other intelligence that otherwise would be discov-
erable. If neither party invokes a privilege there is no resulting
prejudice for the court to remedy. If a party invokes a privi-
lege, however, and the court finds the invocation groundless,
overbroad or otherwise faulty, and therefore potentially preju-
dicial, the court may compel discovery and has broad discretion
to enforce that order." Graystone falls between these two ex-
ble, at least where "a government official puts questions to an individual with the
knowledge that the answers might tend to incriminate him." Baxter, 425 U.S. at
333-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, Justice Brennan argued that the adverse
inference was a method of unconstitutional testimonial compulsion, maintaining
that the point of the line of cases cited by the majority "was not that compulsion
resulted from the automatic nature of the sanction, but that a sanction was im-
posed that made costly the exercise of privilege." Id. at 331-32. He would have
tested for unconstitutional compulsion in Baxter by a less-exacting standard, find-
ing compulsion if the "disciplinary penalty was imposed to some extent, [even] if
not solely, as a sanction for exercising the constitutional privilege." Id. at 332.
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317-18.
41 See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5.
" SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (quoting
United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); see also National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
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tremes: the Graystone defendants validly invoked a privilege
but, either inherently or as a result of late waiver, that invoca-
tion prejudiced the opposing party.
On what does the court base its power to compensate the
opposing party for its disadvantage? The singular nature of the
self-incrimination privilege colors the answer to this question.
There are a number of possible bases for orders to compensate
a party for prejudice arising from an invocation of the self-in-
crimination privilege. Some courts and commentators have
attempted to find a basis for the power in either Rule 26 or 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 5 Reliance on Rule 37
is problematic.46 Both Rule 26 and what has been called a
"general power of the courts to prevent the cat-and-mouse ap-
proach to civil litigation," 7 however, provide bases for preclu-
Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
's Rule 26(c) provides that the court 'may make any order which justice re-
quires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or
undue burden." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (emphasis added). Rule 37 applies in cases of
failure to obey a court order regarding discovery, FED. P. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), or for
failure to respond to discovery. FED. I. Civ. P. 37(d). An order "refusing to allow
the disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or defenses, or pro-
hibting that party from introducing designated matters in evidence," FED. R. CIV.
P. 37(b)(2)(B), among others, may be made.
" Rule 37, by its terms, requires that there be an "order or a "failure" prior
to sanctions being imposed. See FED. F_ CIV. P. 37. Nevertheless, one court has
held that the express power to preclude in Rule 37 may be used, regardless of
whether a motion to compel has actually been made. United States v. 901 N.E.
Lakewood Drive, 780 F. Supp 715 (D. Or. 1991). In Lakewood Drivc, the court
reasoned that a motion to compel under Rule 37 was available and could be
granted, even though the court might be powerless to enforce it by contempt or
another sanction impermissible under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 720-2L Since it
could have been granted, and the defendant resisting discovery had given "no indi-
cation that she would waive her Fifth Amendment privilege," the court held pre-
clusion to be an appropriate sanction for the uncomplied.with, imaginary order to
compel discovery. Id. at 721.
This approach has some bases in common with the position of this
Comment-that there is an inherent, equitable power of the courts to police the
fairness of the discovery and trial process. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying
text. It tacitly acknowledges that total preclusion is constitutionally permissible,
and that prejudice inheres in the total avoidance of discovery by invocation of the
self-incrimination privilege. It is difficult to ignore the plain terms of Rule 37,
however, which provide that sanctions may be imposed for orders made and not
complied with or other "failures?-not for presumed non-compliance with orders
that arguably could have been made. A more direct route to the same destination
is available in courts' equitable power.




sion orders to remedy prejudice from privilege invocations.
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure gives
courts broad power to devise protective orders to combat preju-
dice arising during discovery." One commentator has suggest-
ed that "[b]ecause the invokers [of the privilege] have not vio-
lated any discovery rules, the authority for barring the testi-
mony arises under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)..., which authorizes
any order needed to protect a party from oppression."49 The
wording of the rule, "any order which justice requires,"' ° ap-
pears to allow the court great latitude. Some of the orders
enumerated in Rule 26, however, suggest that the primary aim
of the rule-makers may have been to protect those from whom
discovery is sought, by providing:
(1) that the... discovery not be had; (2) that the... discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions .... ; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not
be inquired into, or that the scope of the.., discovery be limited to
certain matters; (5) that discovery be conducted with no one present
except persons designated by the court; (6) that a deposition after
being sealed be opened only by an order of the court,.... ."
Notwithstanding this focus, the preliminary language gives
courts, at a party's request, broad authority to police unfair
prejudice arising from discovery.
The best grounding for the power to issue preclusion or-
ders lies in courts' inherent equitable power to safeguard the
fair-contest interest. In Graystone, the Third Circuit, echoing
other courts, did not look to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, but simply stated that "[iun a civil trial, a party's invoca-
tion of the privilege may be proper, but it does not take place
in a vacuum; the rights of the other litigant are entitled to
consideration as well." 2 Although courts often do not enumer-
ate a statutory basis for preclusion, their language shows a
general desire to avoid unfair shifts in the balance of power
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
Robert Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil
Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062, 1130 n.248 (1982). Professor Heidt was specifically refer-
ring to the power of courts to preclude in cases of late waiver.
61 FED. R. CM. P. 26(c) (emphasis added).
61 Id.
61 Graystone I, 25 F.3d at 191.
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between the parties like the kind often brought about by in-
vocation of the self-incrimination privilege. These unfair shifts
are inimical to the fair-contest goals of discovery and thus
subject to equitable adjustment.'
The self-incrimination privilege has little value beyond its
value to the privileged party, to either opposing parties or
society. This circumscribed value militates toward strict equi-
table scrutiny by courts in civil cases. The privilege is unlike
others because, by definition, invocation is permissible only if
the party has reasonable grounds to believe that an answer
"would support a conviction or furnish a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a crime."' The
privilege invoker foresees criminal proceedings and, looking
beyond the civil proceeding, prioritizes a concern for possible
criminal punishment over a concern for civil liability. The
direct advantages from assertion of the self-incrimination privi-
lege accrue only to the defendant, and then only within a
' See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989). In
Gutierrez-Rodriguez, the First Circuit stated that
[c]ourts have not been afraid to bar a party from testifying where doing
so was necessary to prevent the thvarting [of] the purposes and policies
of the discovery rules."
The Federal Rules contemplate . ".. fl and equal mutual discovery in
advance of trial" so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury....
The court would not tolerate nor indulge a practice whereby a defendant
by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination during pre-trial exam-
ination and then voluntarily waiving the privilege at the main trial sur-
prised or prejudiced the opposing party.
Id. at 576 (quoting Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810, 815 (D. finn. 1968)); cce
also Wehling v. CBS, 608 F.2d 1084, 1088 (5th Cir. 1980) ('We recognize, of
course, that the [privilege invoker] is not the only party to this action who has
important rights that must be respected."); Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 869
("Fairness dictates this rule.... [A]ny other rule would flout the courts and their
discovery process.").
Hoffnan v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951).
The self-incrimination privilege arguably may provide other, indirect benefits
to society. It may be seen as a bastion against the abuse of governmental power,
or as conferring a generalized heightening of basic human dignity and freedom. All
of the pirivileges noted also further similar ideals. See supra noto 56 and accompa-
nying text. Unlike the self-incrimination privilege, however, they have relationships
underlying them that confer considerable direct benefits to society as a whole
outside of the criminal context. The fifth amendment privilege safeguards only
certain activities, and even those society has deemed criminal. Moreover, other
privileges may by definition be invoked solely for dignity reasons. Conversely, the




While the benefits of the self-incrimination privilege are
limited strictly to the criminal milieu, the broad value of other
privileges provides no such attenuation. Other privileg-
es-attorney-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent-serve other
salutary purposes in both criminal and civil cases, and to soci-
ety as a whole. These extra-judicial benefits ameliorate their
derogatory effect on the information-gathering process, as set
forth by Wigmore.56 All of these other privileges protect rela-
tionships between professionals and their clients; relationships
that, to a varying degree, are at the core of peoples' profession-
al, personal and spiritual lives. These privileges exist because
society has a broad interest in fostering the free communica-
tion indispensable to these relationships. Society at large gains
no such direct benefits from the existence of the self-incrimina-
tion privilege, the effect of which is limited to the prophylactic
protection against compulsion of and use of compelled testimo-
ny in criminal trials. Thus, the strong public interest in the
civil truth-finding process justifies courts' use of their equitable
powers to effectively compensate for imbalances."
of criminal prosecution. In sum, the mere existence of these indirect benefits does
not warrant the expansive treatment accorded to the far more broadly valuable
privileges discussed infra pp. 11-12.
" See Note, Making Sense of the Rules of Privileg Under the Structural
(Il)logic of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1339, 1343-45 (1992)
(expounding Wigmore's rationale for existence of relational privileges); see also
Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corpo-
rate Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 473 (1987) (discussing the usefulness to
business of the attorney-client privilege); Maureen B. Hogan, Note, The Constitu-
tionality of an Absolute Privilege for Rape Crisis Counselling: A Criminal
Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights Versus a Rape Victim's Right to Confidential
Therapeutic Counseling, 30 B.C. L. REV. 411, 420-25 (1989) (balancing value of the
proposed privilege outside the criminal context versus a defendant's constitutional
rights, and arguing that rape crisis counselling fits the Wigmore rationale for rela-
tional privileges); Rorie Sherman, N.J. Supreme Court Weakens Priest-Penitent
Privilege: Legislature Is Expected to Act Quickly to Restore the Sanctity of the Con-
fessional, NAT'L L.J., June 13, 1994, at A15.
"' Courts often rationalize expansion of constitutional privileges by valuing
them more highly than those based upon common law. See, e.g., Graystone II, 25
F.3d at 192. Increased vigilance is indeed desirable, but only in guaranteeing
availability of constitutional privileges within their proper scope. Deference to
expansive claims of privilege justified largely on the basis of the constitutional
nature of the claimed privilege is not required by the Constitution.
[Vol. 61: 275
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II. SEC v. GRAYSTONE NASH, INC.
A. The District Court Opinion
1. Facts and Procedure
Culminating an investigation that had begun in 1989, on
June 30, 1991, the SEC filed a complaint in federal court,
charging the defendants as principals in a complex, wide-rang-
ing and lucrative securities fraud operation.! The defendants
relied on the privilege against self-incrimination throughout
the three-year duration of the SEC's involvement in this mat-
ter, first invoking the privilege during the investigatory phase
on June 12, 1990.6o During telephone depositions on June 10
' Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993). Graystone Nash "traded
corporate securities in the over-the-counter market, creating markets for securities
it previously had underwritten in public offerings." Id. at 866. At the district court
level, three defendants of an initial total of seven remained. President and
Chairman of the Board Thomas Ackerly, Vice President Richard Adams and
Vincent Ackerly, Thomas's brother, who was actively involved in securities trading.
Id. Two others, Shawn Crane and Robert Rock, had final judgments of permanent
injunction entered against them, in which they neither admitted nor denied any of
the allegations of the complaint and agreed to "produce documents and make
[themselves] available for interviews and . . . testify at any depositions, trials or
hearings in this action or in any related ... actions or proceedings." Consent and
Undertakings of Robert L. Rock at 1-2, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (Final Judg-
ment of Permanent Injunction and Other Relief). Note that neither of these parties
had made any admissions nor waived the Fifth Amendment and, as such, till can
invoke the privilege in response to any requests the SEC makes. The court en-
tered default judgments against the corporation and a last defendant, Dennis
Williams, who was enjoined and ordered to disgorge approximately $14 million.
See Order for Issuance of a Bench Warrant and To Show Cause, filed Dec. 11,
1992, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863.
1 Graystone had 35 franchised branch offices around the country for which the
defendants had overall responsibility as corporate officers. Through a program of
coercion of customers and manipulation of the securities in which they made a
market, the defendants allegedly realized illicit trading gains of over $60 million
over the course of 18 months. See Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 866-68 for more
detail. The causes of action alleged against them included violations of various
provisions of the Securities Act, the Exchange Act and certain SEC rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder, which proscribe fraudulent activity, the offer-
ing and sale of unregistered securities, prospectus violations and improper purchas-
es during distributions. Id.
60 Memorandum and Order dated July 23, 1993 at 3, Graystone 1, 820 F. Supp.
863 (order denying both defendants' motions to stay disgorgement order and
Adams's motion to stay injunctive relief, pending appeal).
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and June 22, 1992, each of the defendants, who were repre-
senting themselves, invoked the privilege in response to each
substantive request, thereby totally avoiding discovery. 1 Four
months later, after the close of discovery, 2 on October 23,
1992, the SEC filed motions for an order of preclusion and for
summary judgment against the still silent defendants. 63 The
preclusion request sought to bar the defendants from introduc-
ing evidence as to issues about which they had previously
invoked the privilege, including "respective roles, remuneration
and decisionmaking authority at Graystone." Finally, on De-
cember 14, 1992, almost two months after the SEC's motions
had provided extensive detail about the evidence in its posses-
sion, and two and one-half years after the defendants first
relied on the privilege, the defendants answered by filing re-
sponses and affidavits disputing these points,65 attacking the
evidence given by former Graystone employees,"6 and assert-
ing lack of scienter.7
2. Hearing and Decision
On January 25, 1993, the District of New Jersey heard
argument on the motions to preclude and for summary judg-
ment.6" During the three months elapsed since the SEC had
filed its motions, the defendants had made no attempt to sup-
plement their minimal response to the motions,69 nor had
", Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 869. The Third Circuit elaborated on the
defendants' recalcitrant nature. The court stated that they "refused to answer
questions other than those pertaining to their names, addresses, current employ-
ment and telephone numbers." Graystone II, 25 F.3d 187, 189 (3d Cir. 1994).
' Order Revising Pretrial Schedule, filed May 19, 1992, Graystone I, 820 F.
Supp. 863 (order of U.S. Magistrate Judge Pisano reiterating that "discovery must
be completed on or before September 1, 1992").
Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 189.
Graystone , 820 F. Supp. at 869 & n.8.
" Graystone 1, 25 F.3d at 189.
See Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 866.
' Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 189.
'Id.
" Thomas Ackerly submitted a sworn document that stated that he was under
criminal investigation, and "therefore ... unable to testify in this matter and
[that he] asserted [his] Fifth Amendment privilege." Certification of Thomas V.
Ackerly at 1-2, filed Dec. 14, 1992, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863. He offered to
testify after the criminal investigation was concluded, given the overwhelming evi-
dence of wrongdoing against him. He also contended that the SEC was deflecting
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they volunteered to submit to discovery, nor given any indica-
tion that their response constituted a waiver of the privilege.
The court opened the hearing with a cautionary note to the de-
fendants, stating that they would not be allowed to use their
invocation of the privilege as a "sword."0 The court warned
them that in a civil action the "court does not have to give...
the same deference that you're entitled as if there's some
pending criminal case" and that it could "dismiss answers
or... grant the relief of a plaintiff, where you have chosen to
take the Fifth Amendment."1 The defendants did not recant
their invocation of the privilege at this point, but stated that
they understood the judge's warning.
After the SEC outlined the extensive evidence against the
defendants, the court noted the seeming dilemma created by
defendants' invocation in this civil action-that they essential-
ly had to choose between combatting the civil case and mini-
mizing their criminal exposure.!' The SEC responded that one
possible justification for imposing this burden is that otherwise
the defendants could delay resolution of the case and frustrate
the government's enforcement actions, all for fear of "someday"
his requests for documents and although he had not the 'wherewithal" to attend
depositions of others, he believed that given the opportunity to examine them at
trial he would be able to show the court that their testimony "is not worthy of
belief." Id, He gave no indication that he was willing to provide facts at a mean-
ingfdil time or to otherwise waive the privilege and submit to examination himsel.
he gave ample indication, however, that he would like to attack the sufficiency
and credibility of the SEC's case without dropping the shield of privilege.
Richard Adams incorporated the legal arguments made by Ackerly and pro-
vided certain factual contentions. He averred that he had a total lack of responsi-
bility for trading and management of the firm, lack of ownership interest in the
firm, minimal compensation as shown on tax returns, that he participated in testi-
mony before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"), of which the
SEC had obtained copies (from the NASD) and he attacked the evidence offered by
other former employees of Graystone. His affidavit, however, appears to be un-
sworn, and therefore can carry no weight. Affidavit of Richard Adams, filed Dec.
14, 1992, Graystone 1, 820 F. Supp. 863. Vincent Ackerly's opposing document, also
unswora, incorporates Thomas Ackerly's legal contentions and denies any knowl-
edge of wrongdoing or responsibility in management or trading decisions of the
firm. Defendant Vincent . Ackerly's Request for Denial of Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed Dec. 14, 1992, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863.
7' Transcript of Proceedings of January 25, 1993 at 2, Graystone I, 820 F.
Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993) [hereinafter 'Transcript of Proceedings"].
7 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 2 (emphasis added).
I Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 3.
'3 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 5-6.
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being indicted for the same activities. 4 The court then restat-
ed the defendants' choice, saying "when you look at the lesser
of two evils, to be barred from the securities industry is a less-
er evil than to be forthcoming at a deposition and potentially
expose yourself to criminal conviction and imprisonment." In
other words, the defendants had prioritized the threat of incur-
ring criminal liability over the possibility that the court would
preclude them from offering factual support for their defense in
the civil action, thereby increasing the defendants' risk of los-
ing that action.
The defendants then spoke on their own behalf.76 One
defendant, Thomas Ackerly, complained of insufficient access
to the SEC's evidence, including transcripts of various deposi-
tions." The court noted that the depositions were taken in
Florida, where Ackerly resided, and that he had chosen to not
attend.78 Ackerly made no statement disputing the facts of the
substantive allegations. Another defendant, Richard Adams,
portrayed himself as a pawn in the Graystone operation. Say-
ing that he was only an "operations manager," 9 had no inter-
est in the business,"0 made only a salary during the period in
question, and could bring "friends in the business for 25 years"
to give "expert testimony," he averred that he had no part in
the culpable activities.81
On April 21, 1993, Judge Wolin ruled.82 He first ad-
dressed the SEC's request to preclude the defendants' proffered
evidence. He characterized the defendants' affidavits as con-
taining "denials of wrongdoing, attacks on the former
Graystone employees whose deposition testimony supports this
' Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 5.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 5-6.
7' Vincent Ackerly was not present at the hearing. He also did not participate
in the appeal to the Third Circuit, although he did file a Notice of Appeal dated
June 22, 1993. An appeal in this case was dismissed as untimely filed by the
Third Circuit, with Thomas Ackerly captioned as appellant, on October 12, 1993.
Order dated October 12, 1993, Graystone H, 25 F.3d 187 (C.A. No. 93-5393). One
can only conclude that the name captioned should be Vincent Ackerly rather than
Thomas Ackerly.
" Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 7-8.
78 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70 at 8.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70 at 12.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70 at 12.
Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70 at 12.
8 Graystone , 820 F. Supp. 863.
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motion [for summary judgment] and defenses based on lack of
scienter," and as raising "claims about their respective roles,
remuneration and decisionmaking authority at Graystone. '"
Because of the lack of Third Circuit case law on point,' the
court reviewed factually similar cases from the Southern Dis-
trict of New York. The court decided that the representations
about which the defendants had refused to respond during dis-
covery should be excluded.' The court stated its reasoning.
Fairness dictates this rule. If a party seeks shelter under his
right against self-incrimination, he cannot later emerge and attempt
to formulate a defense with evidence previously withheld from dis-
covery. Further, any resultant prejudice must be borne by the party
asserting the privilege and not by the one subjected to its use.
As the instant case demonstrates, any other rule would flout
the courts and their discovery process. Allowing the New Jersey
defendants [the Ackerlys and Adams] to come forward at this stage,
after plaintiff has deposed many witnesses and submitted its argu-
ments and proofs, would load the scales unjustly. Thus, the court
will not permit the defendants to advance exculpatory claims....
The court then painstakingly examined the sufficiency of the
evidence against the defendants' and the remedies pro-
posed-injunction and disgorgement-and granted summary
judgment and the requested relief to the SEC.' The defen-
m Id. at 869, 869 n.8.
The court noted, however, that "at least one district court in this circuit has
sanctioned its use. Id. at 869 n.7 (citing Goodman v. DeAzoulay, 539 F. Supp. 10,
16 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (granting plaintiffs motion for sanctions and precluding defen-
dant from introducing evidence relating to matters as to which he invoked Fifth
Amendment)). The Third Circuit did not address this case in its argument The
defendant in Goodman invoked the Fifth Amendment during a discovery deposition
about a bank withdrawal, in the context of a real estate deal gone sour. Goodman,
539 F. Supp. at 16. The order dated November 16, 1981, by which the court pre-
cluded the defendant from later introducing evidence relating to this point, is
unpublished. Id.
I Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 869. The court quoted SEC v. Groesman, 121
FYR.D. 207, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), for the preposition that "if a party fails to allow
pre-trial discovery of evidence on his claim of privilege, a preclusion order should
be entered to bar his subsequent use of the evidence." Id.; see awro SEC v.
Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122, 1129 (SM.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp, 106
FLD. 545, 549-50 (SJD.N.Y. 1985). For discussion of the rationale of theza cases,
see infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text.
' Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. at 869 (citations and footnote omitted).





dants appealed the grant of summary judgment and the pre-
clusion order to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
They requested reversal of summary judgment, maintaining
that the district court granted it on a deficient record limited
by an inappropriate preclusion order.90
B. The Third Circuit Opinion
Writing for the Third Circuit, Judge Weis first noted that
"[ulse of the privilege in a civil case may... carry some disad-
vantages for the party who seeks its protection."91 The court
then observed that an adverse party also faces potentially sub-
stantial problems in that it may be deprived of a "source of
information that might conceivably be determinative in a
search for the truth."92 Given the fact that parties may invoke
the privilege and then waive it, perhaps after the discovery
period concludes, Judge Weis addressed two distinct resulting
situations: the consequences of valid invocation and the "effects
when [the privilege] is abused, causing unfair prejudice to the
opposing litigant," such as in cases of late waiver.93
Judge Weis split the balance of the opinion into discussion
of three issues: whether a preclusion order is a constitutionally
impermissible automatic sanction for a valid invocation of the
privilege;94 the test for the availability and scope of remedial
measures in favor of the plaintiffs if the defendants continue to
validly invoke the privilege or attempt to waive it;95 and the
appropriate scope of the SEC's remedy, in light of the afore-
mentioned test, and given the level of prejudice imposed by the
defendants' invocation and waiver.9 6
Graystone Hi, 25 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
91 Id. at 190 (following Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976)); see supra
notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
92 Id.
9Id.
" Id. at 190-91.
" Id. at 191-92.
Graystone 11, 25 F.3d at 191.92.
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1. The Preclusion Order as an Inappropriate Sanction
Judge Weis maintained that in the case of a proper invoca-
tion of the privilege, a preclusion order would be an "inappro-
priate sanction,"9 7 noting that "[t]he Supreme Court has cau-
tioned that the Constitution 'limits the imposition of any sanc-
tion which makes assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
'costly." 8 The court went on to describe a number of cases
where the invoker of the fifth amendment privilege had faced
situations in which either the privilege had to be waived or
penalties would have followed automatically.' Judge Weis
further reasoned that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure0 0
provide that "claims of privilege may be made to withhold ma-
terial otherwise subject to discovery," and therefore give no
basis for ' Inflicting sanctions when there is a valid invocation
of the [privilege].""0' In conclusion, Judge Weis stated that it
was clear from this reasoning "that dismissal of an action or
entry of judgment as a sanction for valid invocation of the
privilege during discovery is improper."" Moreover, since "a
complete bar to presenting evidence, from any source,...
would in all practical effect amount to the entry of an adverse
judgment, [it] would be an inappropriate sanction."
10
2. Remedial Measures for Invocation or Late
Waiver of the Self-Incrimination Privilege
The court next noted that the invocation of the privilege in
a civil trial "does not take place in a vacuum; the rights of
other litigants are entitled to consideration as well." " ' Judge
Weis specified one situation in which concerns for adversaries
arise: when a party rests on the privilege throughout discovery,
" Id. at 190-91.
"Id. at 190 (citing Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 515 (1967), for the propo-
sition discussed supra note 31-42 and accompanying text.).
" Id.; see supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
... See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5).
"' Graystone It, 25 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 1994).





but decides to offer testimony just prior to trial."°5 The court
recognized that in such a case an adverse party would be at a
disadvantage, as the "opportunity to combat the newly avail-
able testimony might not exist, a new investigation could be
required, and orderly trial preparation could be disrupted."1 6
The court cited cases in which courts had issued preclusive
orders in response to this type of prejudice, emphasizing that
those courts had found that the late waiver would allow the
invoker "to impale... accusers with surprise testimony at tri-
al.107
Judge Weis then enunciated a balancing test for the pro-
priety of a remedy in these situations as follows:
A trial court must carefully balance the interests of the party claim-
ing protection against self-incrimination and the adversary's right to
equitable treatment. Because the privilege is constitutionally based,
the detriment to the party asserting it should be no more than is
necessary to prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other
side. °8
The court cited two district court cases from other circuits
where "the necessary accommodation took place."0 9 First, in
FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc.," ° the defendant had invoked
the privilege in response to some discovery requests, but the
court nevertheless allowed him to testify. The Third Circuit
noted that the Kitco court found it significant that the defen-
dant had provided some discovery and, therefore, the FTC had
not been unfairly surprised or prejudiced. Moreover, the FTC
"had been able to thoroughly prepare its case and was not sole-
ly dependent on the plaintiff for pertinent testimony.""'
Judge Weis also cited Young Sik Woo v. Glantz,' in which
the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.. against a de-
fendant who invoked the privilege in response to discovery re-
l00 Id.
100 Id. at 191.
... Graystone II, 25 F.3d at 191 (quoting Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882
F.2d 553, 577 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (4th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990).
"00 Graystone I, 25 F.3d at 192.
'o' Id.
"o 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985).
Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 192.
99 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1983).
" There was no preclusion order at issue.
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quests, but did not offer an affidavit in opposition."1 Accord-
ing to Judge Weis, the Glantz court observed that the defen-
dant had made no showing as to the contested facts or to the
unavailability of third party evidence; he may have been able
to "rebut his opponent's case without his own testimony.""'
Accordingly, the Glantz court, "in the exercise of caution,"
declined to enter judgment, and gave the defendant the oppor-
tunity to conduct further discovery so as to oppose future mo-
tions."
6
The court then summarily rejected two factually similar
cases from the Southern District of New York. In these cases,
the court issued orders totally precluding defendants from
offering any factual support for defenses and denials as to
which they had invoked the privilege during discovery."7 As
in Graystone, these were civil enforcement actions by the SEC
in which defendants had refused to give any substantial dis-
covery and then attempted to combat summary judgment mo-
tions with affidavits and other evidence."1 8 Judge Weis re-
jected the reasoning of SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp. as "not...
satisfactory because the court there did not perform the careful
evaluation used in Kitco.""' As to the other case, SEC v.
Benson,'20 the court noted that it "is not clear from the opin-
ion" whether a total preclusion order was made." Judge
Weis opined, however, that "the [Benson] defendant's
obstructionary conduct throughout the litigation might have
had a bearing on the court's ultimate choice of remedies."1
22
Beyond these cursory references, Judge Weis did not analyze
the reasoning of the cases on which Judge Wolin relied heavily
in his district court opinion.m
U4 Glantz, 99 F-R.D. at 651.
UG Graystone f, 25 F.3d at 192.
U I&
U" See SEC v. Benson, 657 F. Supp. 1122 (SJD.N.Y. 1987); SEC v. Cymaticolor
Corp., 106 F.R.D. 545 (Sfl.N.Y. 1985).
US See Benson, 657 F. Supp. at 1128-29; Cymaticolor, 106 F.R.D. at 549.
"" Graystone 1, 25 F.3d at 192.
US 657 F. Supp. 1122.
"2 Graystone 1, 25 F.3d at 192.
S Id-
ISee supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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3. Determining the Proper Remedy for the SEC in
Graystone
Judge Weis then considered the proper remedy by apply-
ing the balancing test set forth above. 24 First, the Third Cir-
cuit suggested that the trial court should have determined if
defendants had waived their fifth amendment privilege."2
Judge Weis pointed to the following as possibly indicative of a
waiver: the affidavits filed in response to the SEC motions for
preclusion and summary judgment which "addressed some of
the same matters that they had refused to discuss at their
depositions;" statements made at the hearing by defendants;
and a sworn statement made by Adams, prior to the SEC ac-
tion, to the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD"), a quasi-governmental, self-regulatory organiza-
tion."'26 The court also cited NASD testimony and a number of
documents that Adams had turned over to the SEC'27 as fac-
tors that "might... have had some relevance in determining
the appropriate scope of preclusion, assuming that to be a
proper remedy in the circumstances.
Second, the court found that the record did not support the
SEC's claim that it suffered prejudice by the defendants' intro-
duction of evidence after discovery and close to the trial.29
Judge Weis asserted that the SEC had set' the timetable by
filing the motion for preclusion, which "was apparently the
first indication given to defendants that they might be unable
12 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
" Graystone I, 25 F.3d at 193.
"' Id. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text for an argument against
allowing waiver in these circumstances.
The sworn statement cannot operate as a waiver because any waiver "is lim-
ited to the particular proceeding in which the witness volunteers the testimo-
ny .... His voluntary testimony before a coroner's inquest, or a grand jury, or
other preliminary and separate proceeding. . . is therefore not a waiver for the
main trial." United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1210 (1st Cir. 1973) (citation
omitted); accord United States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Miranti, 253 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 1958); In re Neff, 206 F.2d
149, 152 (3d Cir. 1953).
,2 The documents were turned over during the course of the investigation, prior
to the commencement of this action.
12 Graystone HI, 25 F.3d at 193.
29 Id.
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to present any kind of defense or that a trial on the merits
might not be held."" The court stated that the SEC should
have addressed the appropriateness of a preclusion order be-
fore the summary judgment motion was made."3
Finally, the court noted its skepticism of the SEC's claim
that the "new and unexpected evidence" would cause preju-
dice. 32 It pointed out that two of the other defendants had
entered into consent judgments and had agreed to testify at
any evidentiary proceeding, and that the SEC had deposed
several other people whose testimony it had used to support
the motions before the district court." Judge Weis focused
on the information the SEC already possessed; he noted the
substantial evidence gathered and significant resources ex-
pended, finding this to be "a far cry from a case where invo-
cation of the privilege prevented the opposing party from ob-
taining the evidence it needed to prevail in the litigation."'
The court then summed up its view of prejudice and the pre-
clusion order:
Nothing presently in the record persuades us that the SEC would
have been unable to present a strong case even if Adams and
Ackerly had been permitted to testify if they chose. The severe rem-
edy of barring defendants from presenting any evidence from third
parties was even less necessary. The preclusion sanction did not
"level the playing field," but tilted it strongly in favor of the
SEC.125
In closing, the Third Circuit gave some sense of the con-
cerns underlying its opinion. Judge Weis cautioned that when
the government is a party in a civil case, and also controls
possible criminal prosecution, "special consideration should be
given to the plight of the party asserting the Fifth
Amendment."3 ' He also noted the "burden that pro se repre-
sentation imposes upon extremely busy district judges," and
posited that the "the failure of Adams and Ackerly to present









factors that should be considered in directing an appropriate
remedy.W
37
The court cautioned that "[w]e should not be understood as
holding that, in the circumstances of this case, no remedial
measures should be imposed" and noted that "the imposition of
an appropriate remedy is within the discretion of the trial
court." The Third Circuit reversed the summary judgment
granted by the district court as based on a deficient record,
and remanded for consideration of an appropriate remedy in
light of the aforementioned factors."s
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH GRAYSTONE--OF PRACTICAL EFFECTS
AND BALANCING TESTS
A. Summary
In Graystone, the Third Circuit gave its imprimatur to
comprehensive invocations of the self-incrimination privilege in
civil actions. Initially, it emphasized the practical effect of total
preclusion orders in determining the constitutional permissibil-
ity of such orders. In contrast, the Supreme Court deliberately
has limited its definition of inappropriate sanctions to those
that follow automatically upon invocation of the privilege,
without more.139 Even given entry of a preclusion order in its
favor, a plaintiff must prove a prima facie case prior to entry of
judgment, and the defendant may still attack the sufficiency of
that case. Total preclusion orders simply are not automatic
sanctions.
The Third Circuit's condemnation of total preclusion or-
ders as unconstitutional was portentous of its defendant-
friendly balancing test. The court balanced the burden placed
on the right to invoke the self-incrimination privilege against
the prejudice to the opposing party.140 This test gives those
," Id. at 194. Presumably, Judge Wolin did not act without a theory, but found
proper and persuasive legal arguments either in the SEC's motions and supporting
documents or sua sponte. For further discussion of the court's motivation, see infra
notes 221-33 and accompanying text.
'3' Id. at 194.
" See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court authority for this proposition.
140 Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 192.
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invoking the privilege license to prejudice the opposing party
in every civil case, albeit to varying degrees. Furthermore, the
Third Circuit's test is based on factually dissimilar and doc-
trinally unclear authority. The court compounded the preju-
dicial effect of this test by defining prejudice very narrowly.
Instead of focusing on the benefits the SEC was deprived of,
the court's analysis focused on the information that the SEC
was able to obtain despite the defendants' assertion of privi-
lege.1
4 1
The court's test, combined with its restrictive definition of
prejudice, produces a powerful privilege. This strong privilege
is appropriate only in a criminal case, where any countervail-
ing considerations pale in light of a defendant's immediate
criminal jeopardy. A civil case presents no such immediacy,
and in a civil case numerous other important considerations
arise.
The court's concern for the defendants was motivated
partially by its wariness of the government as plaintif, and by
the fact that the defendants were unrepresented."' The court
failed to dig beneath the terms "government" and "pro se" to
unearth any truly disadvantageous effect on the Graystone de-
fendants. Further inquiry reveals that these defendants were
most likely pro se by choice and, even though unrepresented,
capable of mounting a defense. Their likely motivation was
tactical manipulation. Impressive indications of the defendants'
financial resources, the assistance of counsel, and the knowl-
edge necessary for an effective defense all existed in this
case.' Moreover, the increased jeopardy of facing a govern-
ment plaintiff in a civil suit of this type may be somewhat
overstated, as the various arms of the government pursue
important interests other than criminal prosecution."' While
concern for pro se defendants faced with governmental resourc-
es may be appropriate at times, or even generally, that concern
was inappropriate in this case.
", Id,
" See infra notes 226.45 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
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B. Preclusion Is Not an Automatic Sanction
The plaintiff must carry at least one potentially daunting
burden prior to the entry of judgment after a total preclusion
order: establishment of a prima facie case.4 . In a complex,
multi-party litigation such as Graystone, the SEC must estab-
lish a prima facie case such that a reasonable jury could find
in its favor on each element of the causes of action and counts
alleged.'46 Because defendants do not automatically lose, to-
' See, e.g., Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993); SEC v. Cymaticolor,
106 F.R.D. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
146 See Graystone I for a good example of the complexity of this task. Original-
ly, there were seven defendants: Graystone Nash, Inc., Dennis Williams, Shawn
Crane, Robert Rock, Thomas Ackerly, Vincent Ackerly, and Richard Adams. The
first four cases were disposed of prior to the proceedings in the district court,
Graystone and Williams by default judgment and Crane and Rock by consent judg-
ments. 820 F. Supp. 863, 866. Besides the testimony of Crane and Rock, the SEC
needed to draw on the deposition testimony of eight other individuals to establish
its prima facie case: Joseph McGowan, Chairman and co-owner of Outwater &
Wells (Graystone's clearing house), David Spring, Outwater's President, Stephen
Ware, originally a Graystone broker and later operations manager, David Torrey, a
broker in Boca Raten and later founder of a branch in Jacksonville, Florida, Jose
Gallego and Sean Boyle, senior officials in the Boca Raton office and later manag-
ers of the Chicago branch, John Mather, compliance officer, and Michael
Kupferman, a broker. Id. The national character of the alleged securities viola-
tions, the 18-month course of the activities and the large number of players re-
quired extensive proof.
There were four causes of action. The second, third and fourth alleged, respec-
tively, that the defendants offered and sold unregistered securities in contravention
of § 5(a) and (c) of the Securities Act of 1933, that they violated the prospectus
requirements of § 5(b) of the Act, and that they made improper purchases during
distributions contrary to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)(6)
promulgated thereunder. Id. at 868.
The first cause of action best shows the task of the SEC in establishing a
prima facie case. The defendants were charged with violations of § 17(a) of the
Securities Act of and §§ 10(b) and 15(c) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Rules
10(b)(5) and 15cl-2 promulgated thereunder, for allegedly fraudulent activity. Id.
To establish liability under these provisions, the SEC had to prove that each of
the defendants 1) engaged in fraudulent conduct 2) in connection with the pur-
chase or sale of securities 3) through the means of transportation or communica-
tion in interstate commerce or the mails 4) with the requisite scienter. Id. at 870-
71; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976). As misrepresentations and omissions on the part of the
defendants were alleged, the SEC also had to prove materiality. Graystone I, 820
F. Supp. at 871; see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
To establish fraudulent conduct, the SEC pieced together the operations of
Graystone from the testimony of the aforementioned deponents. According to the
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tal preclusion is not an automatic sanction. In other words, the
defendants' situation is not either-or, as in "either waive the
Fifth or lose the case, or a job, or be disbarred."'4 Thus, the
Constitution does not proscribe total preclusion. Total preclu-
sion of all factual support for denials and defenses as to which
a party has invoked the privilege therefore may be an appro-
priate court-ordered remedy for either actual or potential prej-
udice accruing to an opposing party from the invocation.
In short, the Third Circuit erred in holding that "practi-
cally automatic" equals "automatic."4 ' The Third Circuit
found that the "practical effect" of preclusion orders removes
them from the realm of permissible remedies into that of
"sanction[s] which make assertion of the Fifth Amendment
privilege 'costly.""'49 This "practical effect" method of defining
when a measure is "costly" directly conflicts with Supreme
trial court, the SEC established that the defendants "sought to gain control over
the market in their house stocks by strongarming brokers and individual inves-
tors." Graystone 1, 820 F. Supp. at 871. More specifically, the SEC showed that,
for 18 months, the defendants controlled the resale prices of all offerings of the
house stocks, sold quantities of common stock at predetermined prices and sys-
tomatically restricted investor's right to sell their shares by refusing to execute
sell tickets. Id. The day-to-day mechanism for these activities is set forth in detail.
See id. at 866-68. All of this investigation and proof belies the notion that proving
this type of case is a simple matter.
147 See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text; cee alco Rainier Natl Bank v.
Hartstein, No. 91-36164, 1993 WIL 175265, at *4-*5 (9th Cir. May 25, 1993) (de-
scribing use of preclusion as that of a 'less burdensome vehicle" than entry of
summary judgment or directed verdict to prevent unfairness to the opposing party,
and characterizing preclusion as "the price of, not the penalty for," defendant's
invocation of the privilege).
' See Fendler, supra note 17, at 1161. Professor Fendler emphasizes that all
of the Court's holdings find the automatic nature of the deprivation to be the
paramount factor in assessing a measure. Id. at 1169. ("In determining whether
an adverse consequence amounts to an unconstitutional penalty, whether the ad-
verse consequence automatically follows the exercise of the privilege is more im-
portant than [its] severity."). He also goes on, however, to discount the importance
of the intervening necessity that the plaintiff establish a prima facie care, improp-
erly concluding that "practically automatic" is legally sufficient. Id. at 1179.
148 Graystone IH, 25 F.3d at 190 (quoting Spevack v. lein, 385 U.S. 511, 515
(1967)). The use of the word "sanction" as opposed to remedy is problematic
throughout this line of cases. The Supreme Court cases focus on ron-judaicial situa-
tions where the word is used more synonymously with "penalty," and on the effect
of the invocation of privilege on invokers ie., invoke and lose a job. Conversely,
remedy consideration focuses on the effect of invocation upon the opposing party,
and its purpose is to compensate for that effect Accordingly, what is forbidden as




Court authority. The Court has proscribed only those conse-
quences that are truly automatic upon invocation.5 0 Indeed,
despite citing the Spevack line of cases-where failure to waive
the privilege would have resulted or did result in automatic
statutory or administrative termination of employment or of-
fice-as exemplary of the Court's reasoning, the Third Circuit
simply concluded that "practically automatic" is sufficient. As
noted earlier, however, the Supreme Court in Baxter clearly
rejected that reasoning,"' permitting total preclusion to be a
proper remedy in certain circumstances.
Reasoning from this Supreme Court precedent, the South-
ern District of New York has endorsed the principle that where
a plaintiff must bear its burden of proof, preclusion of support
for a defense is not an automatic deprivation of a constitution-
al right. In SEC v. Cymaticolor,5 2 the defendant contended
that a total preclusion order made the assertion of the privi-
lege costly.'53 The court acknowledged that, under Spevack, it
could not make the invocation "costly,"" 4 but concluded that
the "risk of losing [the] case on the merits without the use of
the evidence is not the type of cost that is prohibited."
55
Again, increased risk of losing on the merits does not equal
automatic deprivation.
Courts sometimes have focused on the related proposition
that entry of an adverse judgment, if entered on the basis of
invocation of the privilege, without more, may be an unconsti-
tutional automatic penalty. 6' Baxter stands for this proposi-
tion. Describing Baxter, the Supreme Court later remarked
that:
Respondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a number of factors
to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was
given no more probative value than the facts of the case warranted;
here, refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment leads automatically and
without more to imposition of sanctions.'67
, See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's holdings and rationales.
"' See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
152 106 F.RD. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
153 Id. at 550.
154 See supra note 32.
Cymaticolor, 106 FRI). at 550 (emphasis added).
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977); see supra text ac-
companying note 39.
" Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5 (emphasis added). In Cunningham, the
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In National Acceptance Co. of America v. Bathalter,ra the
Seventh Circuit specified what constituted "more." In
Bathalter, the district court had entered judgment on the
pleadings against a defendant who had invoked the fifth
amendment privilege as his only response to the complaint.'
The issue raised on appeal was whether dismissal was an
appropriate response."0 The Seventh Circuit relied on Baxter
as "[tihe Supreme Court decision coming closest to" the
case,161 and decided that "defendant's claim of privilege
should not have been deemed an admission, and that plaintiff
should have been put to its proof, either by way of evidentiary
support for a motion for summary judgment or at trial.""
Thus, the court found that the evidentiary burden of summary
judgment was sufficient to satisfy Baxter.
Unlike the defendant in Bathalter, the SEC was put to its
proof in Graystone after the preclusion order, prior to the entry
of judgment." The SEC successfully established each ele-
ment of its prima facie case against the defendants on its mo-
tion for summary judgment. Thus, the district court's decision
in Graystone was consistent with Bathalter, Baxter and the
automatic deprivation test. If a deprivation is not automatic,
but may occur only after further proof, a proposed remedy is
constitutionally permissible. The court may then assess the
appropriateness of that remedy in light of the facts of the case.
defendant was required to either waive the privilege or automatically forfeit polit-
ical party office.
705 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983).
'9 See id. at 926.
1GO Id.
161 Id, at 929-.30.
2 Id. at 932. The Third Circuit inaccurately cites Bathaltcr as supportive of
the proposition that "dismissal of an action or entry of judgment as a sanction for
a valid invocation of the privilege during discovery is improper.' Graystone IT, 25
F.3d at 191. Bathalter was dismissed in the district court and therefore cannot
fairly be said to stand for such an assertion. Other courts have stated that dis-
missal, while not available as an automatic sanction, might be appropriate as a
remedy to prevent unfairness to the party opposing the invoker. See, eg., Wehling
v. CBS, 608 F.2d 1084, 1087 n.6 (5th Cir. 1979) (cautioning that "dismissal is
appropriate only where other, less burdensome remedies would be an ineffective
means of preventing unfairness to [the opposing party]'). Id. at 1088.
1" See Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993); oupra note 143.
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C. Take Away the Sword: In Civil Cases, Prejudice Should Be
Compensated, Not Balanced
1. The Proper Test
In civil cases, if constitutional concerns have been satis-
fied, courts should apply a remedy calculated to completely
neutralize any prejudice falling upon the party opposing an
invocation of the privilege. In contrast, the Third Circuit bal-
anced the burden on the defendants' right to invoke against
the degree of prejudice to the plaintiff to determine the type
and scope of remedy. The court concluded that "the detriment
to the party asserting [the privilege should be] no more than is
necessary to prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the
other side."' This test, on its face, manifests a willingness to
tolerate some degree of prejudice, so long as it is no more than
is fair and necessary. Instead, courts should only balance the
weight of the prejudicial burden on the opposing party against
the counterweight of a proposed remedy. The only goal should
be to compensate for the adverse effects of privilege invocation,
not to subsidize privilege invocation in a civil case.
Moreover, the court's reliance on FTC v. Kitco of Nevada,
Inc.6" and Young Sik Woo v. Glantz,'66 as illustrative of the
"careful evaluation" of its proposed balancing test, is
faulty.67 A closer look at these cases reveals important factu-
al differences and, more importantly, that the Kitco court actu-
ally applies a strictly compensatory standard. In fact, a com-
pensatory standard, also applied by courts in the Southern
District of New York, has more authoritative support and is
more desirable for broad policy reasons than the Graystone
standard. 6 '
The cases on which the Third Circuit relies fail to support
its lenient balancing standard. To buttress this test, the court
relied on FTC v. Kitco of Nevada, Inc., where the defendant
... Graystone I, 25 F.3d at 192.
"' 612 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minn. 1985).
166 99 F-R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1983).
... Graystone II, 25 F.3d at 192. See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text
for the court's interpretation of these cases.
"' See infra notes 182-201 and accompanying text.
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had invoked the privilege at a deposition "only in regard to
certain areas of inquiry,"'69 unlike the total avoidance in
Graystone. In response to this partial invocation in discovery,
the Kitco court found a complete bar on testimony and presen-
tation of evidence to be inappropriate. 70 The court went on to
gauge the prejudice to the plaintiff and to assess what remedy,
if any, should be imposed. The court found that the FTC had
not been "unfairly surprised or prejudiced," and thus declined
to adopt even "a more limited ban.""' The Kitco court did not
mention balancing. Indeed, the notion that the court intended
to remedy any prejudice that it found is further supported by
its reliance on Lyons v. Johnson." Lyons provided that the
invoker's
obtaining of this shield... could not provide a sword to her for
achieving assertion of her claims against the defendants without
having to conform to the processes necessary to orderly and equal
forensic functioning.... If any prejudice is to come from such a situ-
ation, it must, as a matter of basic fairness,] ... be to the party
asserting the claim and not to the one who has been subjected to its
assertion. It is the former who has made the election to create an
imbalance in the pans of the scales."
The Kitco court found that there was no prejudice, but cited
Lyons, suggesting that if it had found prejudice, the party
invoking the privilege would have shouldered it. This disposi-
tion conflicts with the test formulated by the Third Circuit, a
test that suggests prejudice to the opposing party can be fair
and necessary.' 4 The Third Circuit test, combined with its
-9 612 F. Supp. at 1290.
170 Id. at 1291.
171 Id, The Kitco court's assessment of the degree of prejudice, however, was
made with the same narrow, results-based focus that the court in Grayctone H
advocated and with which this Comment takes issue: 'The FTC thoroughly pre-
pared its case and seemed able to anticipate through other witnesses what [the
defendant's] testimony might be. It was not solely dependent upon the testimony
of [the defendant] for pertinent information.? Id. See infra notes 212-15 and ac-
companying text for a more considered view of the prejudice that plaintiff in this
situation suffer.
172 415 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969).
173 Id. at 542 (emphasis added). In Lyons, the plaintiff had invoked the privi-
lege during discovery, the final sentence makes clear, though, that the court found
that any prejudice should fall upon the invoker because that party has "made the
election to create an imbalance in the pans of the scales," not because that party
had brought the action. Id.
274 See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
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definition of prejudice, will allow the privilege to be used as a
sword in many situations. This use of the privilege will unduly
disadvantage opposing parties and prevent a fair contest be-
tween civil litigants.
Neither does the other case on which the Third Circuit
rested its decision, Young Sik Woo v. Glantz,7 ' support the
balancing formulation. Moreover, Glantz does not carefully
evaluate prejudice to the plaintiff. In Glantz, the matter before
the court was a motion for summary judgment; there was no
preclusion order at issue."6 The defendant had invoked the
privilege during discovery' and had not filed an affidavit in
response to the plaintiffs motion.' Further, the defendant
had made no attempt to introduce evidence that would show a
genuine issue of material fact requiring trial.'79 The court, af-
ter a lengthy discussion of the absolute propriety of summary
judgment in such a situation, exercised "an abundance of cau-
tion" and deferred entry of judgment' to allow the defen-
dant an opportunity to "engage in such discovery as he
deem [ed] propitious to secure facts essential to justify his oppo-
sition."' The dissimilarities in the fact pattern and proce-
dural context of Glantz and Graystone are such as to preclude
any application of the lessons of the former to the latter. Exer-
cising forbearance in the interests of justice without evaluating
prejudice that may accrue to the plaintiff is hardly supportive
of the Third Circuit's balancing rule, in which evaluation of
prejudice is essential.
Rather than focusing on dissimilar or inapposite prece-
dent, the Third Circuit should have adopted the test that the
Southern District of New York formulated and applied in SEC
176 99 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1983).
17 Id.
177 There was no elaboration on the scope of Glantz's invocation of the privilege
during discovery.
I's Glantz, 99 F.R). at 651. The defendant responded to the motion with only
a Memorandum in Opposition. Id. at 651 n.1. The court stated that in this docu-
ment the defendant "insinuates that the averments upon which the pending mo-
tion is bottomed may be less than Holy Writ, [but that] he nowhere articulates
any particularized challenge." Id. at 652.
119 Id. at 653-54.
The court decided to "deny the pending motion without prejudice to the right
of the movants to renew it at any time on or after" one month and 19 days after
the date of decision. Id. at 654.
181 Id.
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v. Benson"8 2 and SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp. " In Benson, the
defendant, president of a publicly held company, was accused
of diverting over $500,000 from the company in a fraudulent
scheme.'i 4 Similar to the defendants in Graystone, Benson
refused to participate in discovery for an extended period, to
the point of obstruction."s He then invoked the privilege, re-
fusing to respond to queries about any of the denials and de-
fenses asserted in his answer." In entering an order of pre-
clusion, the court found that "[alithough [Benson] cannot be
required to incriminate himself, he may not use the shield to
the disadvantage of civil adversaries. " " In Benson, as in
Graystone, the court carefully limited its total preclusion order
to defenses and denials about which there was no discov-
ery.lss There, as in Graystone, the defendant totally avoided
discovery. The court consequently precluded him from offering
any factual support for any of his defenses and denials."
' 657 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D..Y. 1987).
U3 106 F.R.D. 545 (SMD.N.Y. 1985).
' Benson, 657 F. Supp. at 1124-25.
's I&. at 1128-29 (over a year passed from first discovery requests until issu-
ance of the preclusion order). The Graystone defendants invoked the privilege at
least two and one-half years before they finally disputed the plaintiff's case. See
supra note 65 and accompanying text. They also failed to appear at a pre-trial
conference, which prompted the magistrate judge to consider sanctions. Order dat-
ed May 13, 1992, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863.
Benson, 657 F. Supp. at 1129.
' SEC v. Benson, No. 84 Civ. 2262, 1985 WL 1308, at '2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9,
1985). The court cited the same case as the Kitco court, Lyons v. Johnson, 415
F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1969), for this proposition. See supra notes 172-73 and accom-
panying text.
' Benson, 1985 WL 1308 at *2 ('Defendant Benson is hereby precluded from
offering evidence in support of his denials and affrmative defenses, positions on
which he has declined to furnish disclosure claiming privilege under the Fifth
Amendment.").
I" The preclusion order in Benson was granted in 1935, two years before entry
of summary judgment for the SEC. See supra note 182. Therefore, preclusion was
allowed as a remedy for a valid invocation of the privilege and not, as in
Graystone I, in light of a late attempt at waiver. The court in Benson, however,
found the defendant's request to engage in discovery, presumably to find evidence
other than his own testimony to oppose summary judgment. inappropriate as an
alternative to immediate entry of summary judgment. 657 F. Supp. at 1129-30.
The court note& l[It is only now that the SEC has amassed a powerful case on
the motion for summary judgment that Benson proposes to pursue a slightly dif-
ferent strategy," and that, as he 'had the opportunity to take discovery for a
year[].... [to permit him to reopen discovery now would abuse the plaintiffs
rights." Id. This reasoning could be applied just as appropriately to Graystone re-
garding the late waiver attempt implicit in the defendant's last minute responses
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In Cymaticolor, the Southern District again took from a
defendant the sword supplied by privilege. The defendant was
a corporate officer accused of manipulating the company's
stock. He had invoked the privilege as to selected denials and
defenses, and in response the SEC sought a total preclusion
order as to those denials and defenses.19 The court first dis-
pensed with the defendant's argument that a total preclusion
order was an automatic deprivation. 9 ' Once past the consti-
tutional issue, the court noted the prejudicial effects on the
SEC."'92 Finally, the Cymaticolor court imposed a preclusion
order as to the denials and defenses with regard to which the
privilege was asserted. In so doing, the court effectively re-
moved the sword from the defendant's possession without run-
ning afoul of Supreme Court automatic deprivation strictures.
2. Why Focus on Removing the Sword Rather Than on the
Integrity of the Shield?
Compensatory orders such as those issued by the courts in
Graystone I, Cymaticolor and Benson, and the manner in
which they lessen the utility of the privilege in civil cases,
certainly provide a defendant with reason to hesitate before
adopting the strategy of stonewalling discovery. This result is
desirable in light of the other important substantive and proce-
dural interests at stake in these cases.'93 Substantively, SEC
civil enforcement actions, as well as other civil enforcement,
regulatory and administrative actions and proceedings, are
valuable vehicles both for ensuring that offenses against the
public are not repeated-by obtaining injunctive, deterrent or
retributive relief' 94-and for compensating the public,
after an extended period of fifth amendment silence.
"' SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.RD. 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). It is worth
clarifying that total preclusion orders should apply only to denials and defenses as
to which the defendant has provided no discovery and not to all denials and de-
fenses. This is an important distinction in situations like Cymaticolor, where only
certain denials and defenses are concealed by the invocation. In a Graystone situa-
tion, however, this is a non-distinction; the defendant has provided no discovery at
all, dictating that the remedy must apply to all asserted denials and defenses.
"' See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text for the Cymaticolor court's
rebuttal of the constitutional objection.
"' Cymaticolor, 106 F.R.D. at 549-50.
"' See infra notes 194-201 and accompanying text.
" The SEC could have sought a civil penalty "not to exceed three times the
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through disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that countervailing
interests such as these are a valuable consideration by placing
greater limits on the effectiveness of the self-incrimination
privilege in government-initiated civil actions than in criminal
proceedings. For instance, the proper administration of the
"correctional process and important state interests other than
conviction for crime" were at issue in Baxter.' 9 Other exam-
ples of important considerations underlying civil actions in-
clude anti-trust actions, in which the maintenance of business
competition and injunction of anti-competitive behavior are
important policy concerns; 9 ' and civil rights actions, which
address violations of constitutional rights in a civil context."
profit gained or loss avoided as a result of such unlawful purchase or sale" in
addition to or instead of the injunction and disgorgement sought in Grayctone .
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-376, § 1, 93 Stat. 1264 (1984)
(adding § 21A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934), as amended by Insider
Trading Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-704, § 3(a){2), 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) limiting lia-
bility for aiding and abetting, and establishing liability for persons controlling
primary violators subject to a $1 million cap).
These civil penalties have raised the specter of double jeopardy. The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), held that penalties would
constitute punishment if they were grossly disproportionate to the loss suffered by
the government, regardless of whether civil or criminal penalties were amessed
first. See also United States v. Mlarcus Schloss & Co., 724 F. Supp. 1123, 1126
(S.DN.Y. 1989) (interpreting Halper and stating that 'exaction before imposition of
criminal punishment should have the same double jeopardy effect as exaction af-
terwards"). Loss is defined to include costs of investigating and prosecution.
Halper, 490 U.S. at 446 n.6; see also Schloss, 724 F. Supp. at 1128 (holding that
a total penalty of $273,800 on total profit disgorged of $136,000 was not "wholly
divorced from the level of fraud and the government's expenses, including those of
investigation and prosecution" and, therefore, did not constitute a penalty). Courts
have further expanded the permissible penalty by recognizing general and rather
nebulous societal damage. See 3B HAROLD S. BLO0IMENTHAIe SECURITIES AND FED-
ERAL CORPORATE LAW § 9.46 (1994) (citing a number of expansive readings of
damage in the course of a general discussion of the history of and outlook for §
21A); David S. Rudstein, Civil Penalties and Multiple Punishment Under the Dou-
ble Jeopardy Clause: Some Unanswered Questions, 46 OKLA. L. REV. 587 (1993)
(summarizing the Halper doctrine, describing its elements and analyzing recent
cases). Under this case law, double jeopardy seems to allow plenty of room for
civil penalties.
"' Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976).
"' Anti-trust violations are subject to both civil action and criminal prosecution.
Sherman Act §§ 1-3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
97 Often, civil rights actions arise where criminal actions may later be brought
by the state. See, e.g., Gutierrez-lodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir.
1989) (civil rights action by motorist against squad of policemen after the officers
without identifying themselves, alit from an unmarked car with guns drawn, and
1995]
BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW
Finally, as in Graystone, the interests of past and future inves-
tors, who may be affected by conduct that violates regulations,
in addition to the common interest of the government and the
public in an orderly, fair and liquid securities markets, are all
worthy concerns. These important pursuits demand a limited
and controlled privilege in the civil context; they are furthered
as its insulatory effect is lessened.
Procedural and systemic considerations also point to the
desirability of a weakened privilege in a civil context. As a
threshold matter, the privilege "has little to do with a fair trial
and derogates rather than improves the chance for accurate
decisions."19 Many believe that the privilege actually "under-
mine[s] ... the trial system's capacity to ascertain the
truth."'99 Such limits, however, enhance the chance of accu-
rate decisions and facilitate the search for the truth. The privi-
lege only takes on an overriding importance in a criminal pro-
ceeding; only there, where obtaining a criminal conviction is
the state's single predominant interest, is the defendant's need
for protection sufficiently immediate and powerful."'
The essential effect of the availability of total preclusion
orders is to encourage earlier waiver of the privilege by those
who are inclined to do so. If the party consciously asserting the
privilege has prioritized the fear of criminal prosecution, then
the threat of a preclusion order will have no effect on the deci-
sion to maintain the invocation. The penalty in the civil phase
is not made any greater by preclusion. Conversely, if the party
merely is asserting the privilege tactically, then forcing an
earlier, less prejudicial waiver is a highly desirable goal in
light of this abuse of the privilege. Total preclusion of factual
support for all defenses and denials is at one end of the spec-
trum of remedies; towards the other end, partial preclusion" 1
and other less restrictive measures may suffice to remedy more
selective use of the privilege. The availability of this range of
shot and injured the motorist as he attempted to flee the perceived threat).
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319.
Heidt, supra note 49, at 1082.
"' See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318-19.
"' Partial preclusion might proscribe support for certain denials and defenses,
or the defendant's testimony only, as opposed to all factual support from any
source for all denials and defenses where discovery has been completely stone-
walled by assertion of the privilege.
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trial management options encourages selectivity both in the
utilization of the privilege and the scope of the invocation,
while leaving open the option of silence to maximize insulation
from criminal prosecution.
Another important factor weighted toward adopting a
compensatory standard to circumscribe offensive uses of the
privilege is the potential that overly lenient balancing will
totally defeat the process of discovery and undermine the prin-
ciples of equality and openness that support it. Accordingly,
the method of defining and measuring prejudice caused by
invocation is of paramount importance in shaping a measure to
remedy this counterproductive potential. As both case law and
policy concerns support a compensatory standard, including
the use of appropriately tailored preclusion orders, a broader
and fairer method of gauging prejudice than that used by the
Third Circuit is warranted.
3. Prejudice to the SEC in Graystone: Ask Not of the SEC
What It Has, Ask of What It Was Deprived
The Third Circuit approached the question of prejudice by
assessing the possibility of waiver, the timing of the preclusion
request, the facts the SEC had, and the relative strength of its
case if the court allowed the defendants to testify. First, the
court assessed the possibility of waiver.2 In the view of the
court, waiver either would have obviated a preclusion remedy
or limited its scope. The court then stated that the SEC should
have resolved the issue of preclusion prior to moving for sum-
mary judgment and that any prejudice relating to this timing
was the SEC's fault. The court went on to note that the SEC
21 The defendants' affidavits opposing the Commissiones summary judgment
motion will almost certainly be found to be attempts to waive the fifth amend-
ment privilege previously invoked. The affidavits contained assrtions about their
"respective roles, remuneration and decisionmaking authority at Graystone," infor-
mation which they had previously maintained was wholly privileged. Grayclone I,
820 F. Supp. at 869. They may attempt to maintain that the testimony in the
affidavits was only a partial waiver, and that they therefore are still able to in-
voke as to other denials and defenses, unrelated to the testimony proffered. Be-
cause the crux of their denials and defenses is that they, 1) did not play a part in
the illicit activities, 2) did not receive any money from them, and 3) did not have
anything to do with deciding to undertake them, however, it is difficult to see
what issues they would maintain their testimony did not touch.
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"possessed substantial evidence" and that it was "apparent
that the government had devoted substantial resources to
expose the fraudulent security arrangements and proceed
against those responsible."2 3 Finally, the court noted that
"nothing... in the record persuades us that the SEC would
have been unable to present a strong case even if Adams and
Ackerly had been permitted to testify if they chose.' 04 Judge
Weis also noted that the SEC was able to depose other wit-
nesses and had other former defendants at its disposal to pro-
vide testimony, if needed.2 5
Preliminarily, if the court were to find or allow a waiver so
late in the proceedings, 2 1 it would set a precedent that would
give subsequent defendants a degree of advantage. To be sure,
the degree will vary, depending upon the availability of other
sources of information, and the ability of particular defendants
to benefit from the judicial gift of hindsight. Yet, some advan-
tage would obtain in nearly every case. Only the availability of
a prophylactic measure, such as preclusion in cases of late
waiver, will ensure that defendants cannot profit from their
exercise of the self-incrimination privilege, and will deter
abuse of the privilege and the civil discovery process.
In a section preceding its waiver discussion, the Third
"' Graystone H, 25 F.3d at 193.
204 Id.
200 Id.
20 The focus throughout this Comment is on compensating for invocation in two
situations: where there is a valid invocation of the privilege throughout discovery,
without an attempt at waiver, and where there is a late attempt at waiver. The
earlier in the action a party attempts to waive the privilege and respond to dis.
covery, the less should be the magnitude of compensatory measures. Earlier in dis.
covery, there is less of a hindsight advantage conferred, and less of the advantag-
es of timely discovery are lost or diminished. Very early in the action, waiver
should be uniformly allowed with appropriate compensatory safeguards.
The approach of the Third Circuit to allowing waiver could lead to perverse
results. For instance, early in discovery, a defendant may note that a plaintiff
does not have significant sources of evidence independent of defendant's testimony.
The defendant could consequently decide to waive a short-lived assertion of privi-
lege to be deposed, secure in the knowledge that his self-serving testimony will
most likely be uncontradicted. Faced with an attempted waiver of privilege by the
defendant, the Third Circuit would simply allow waiver, assuming that discovery
subsequently could ameliorate any prejudice to the plaintiff, and never reach its
assessment of the evidence test. Under a compensatory approach, the court would
be free to assess what the plaintiff lost in the time that it was not able to con-
duct discovery, and to impose a preclusion measure if the potential to subvert the
discovery process was sufficiently strong.
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Circuit relied on a case in which a court did not allow such a
late waiver: Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena.' The court
prefaced its discussion of Gutierrez-Rodriguez with this sum-
mary of the argument against late waiver.
One of the situations in which [concern for other litigant's rights]
comes into play arises when one party invokes the Fifth Amendment
during discovery, but on the eve of trial changes his mind and de-
cides to waive the privilege. At that stage, the adverse par-
ty-having conducted discovery and prepared the case without the
benefit of knowing the content of the privileged matter-would be
placed at a disadvantage. The opportunity to combat the newly
available testimony might no longer exist, a new investigation could
be required, and orderly trial preparation could be disrupted. In
such circumstances, the belated waiver of the privilege could be
unfair20
In Graystone, the SEC had "conducted discovery and prepared
the case without the benefit of knowing the content of the
privileged matter." 9 Two possible distinctions between the
cited circumstances and Graystone can be drawn: first, that the
potential waiver in Graystone was not "on the eve of trial," or
second, that the SEC experienced no real prejudice from the
"belated waiver" attempt.
A comparison with Gutierrez-Rodriguez does not support
the viability of these possible distinctions. Though the attempt-
ed waiver in Gutierrez-Rodriguez took place four days before
the scheduled trial date,21 the principle in Graystone is pre-
cisely the same. In both cases, discovery was closed and the
parties were moving toward a decision on the merits. The de-
fendants in Graystone decided to testify only after they had
seen all of the SEC's argument on the merits, which had ac-
companied its motion for summary judgment. This circum-
stance is, in fact, as prejudicial as a waiver on the eve of trial,
and is more analogous to a waiver at trial after proofs have
been presented. The prejudice to plaintiffs in both of these
situations of attempted late waiver is severe, and as such
courts should police it.2"
217 882 F.2cl 553 (1st Cir. 1989).
G1 Oraystone fI, 25 F.3d at 191 (emphasis added).
29 Id,
210 Gutierrez-Bodriguez, 553 F.2d at 576.




The court noted that the timing of the preclusion motion,
made concurrently with the motion for summary judgment, did
not support a conclusion that the SEC was prejudiced. This
view ignores the practical realities of litigation. These defen-
dants were two of the principal figures in the alleged fraudu-
lent scheme. Obviously, given a choice, the SEC would rather
obtain discovery from these defendants than piece information
together from other, less direct sources. Less investigation
saves time and money. Questioning principals in the scheme
provides much more meaningful opportunity to narrow issues
and gain intelligence on their tactical use of information. The
SEC must walk a proverbial tightrope in the Third Circuit. If
the SEC moves for preclusion early, during discovery, the court
will most likely find that there is not enough prejudice to war-
rant the remedy, necessitating perhaps a later motion, intensi-
fied investigatory efforts, or both. On the other hand, if the
SEC moves later, after the close of discovery and its investiga-
tion, the court will not allow preclusion because the SEC now
may have "enough" evidence, or should have resolved the mat-
ter earlier. The court's analysis will often foreclose plaintiffs in
the position of the SEC from meaningful redress.
The timing of the motion is less important if the court
takes a broader view of the degree of prejudice a party incurs
when its adversary stonewalls its discovery requests. The court
in Graystone effectively penalized the SEC for developing a
strong case against the defendant. The court failed to take into
account that the case would be even stronger if the defendants
were denied the fruits of a tactical recantation of their invoca-
tion of the privilege. The court's focus on the availability of
other witnesses ignores the broad practical and legal benefits
of discovery from the defendants themselves. These benefits go
far beyond simply eliciting factual answers to a sequence of
questions, with each answer in vacuum-like isolation. The
court's approach highlights the overarching problem of gauging
the impact of total avoidance: quantifying the "facts" a party
has is much simpler than calculating the often more subtle
prejudice to that party that may result from the opposition's
comprehensive invocation of the self-incrimination privilege.
Discovery is meant to provide far more than facts. An
assessment of prejudice should look both forward and back, to
determine what other valuable intelligence the invoking party
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has concealed or obscured. The invoking defendant deprives
the plaintiff of a complete opportunity to "ascertain the posi-
tion of the adverse party on the controverted issues,"2 12 espe-
cially as to the opposition's "theory and use of the evi-
dence."213 This intelligence may be otherwise impossible to
obtain. If a defendant in the position of those in Graystone had
not invoked at all or had waived the privilege earlier, there
would have been a "definite impact on the course of... discov-
ery.- 2 14 Other avenues of inquiry could have been opened or
doubt cast on other testimony, or possible perjury in the
defendant's testimony exposed in light of other evidence. The
SEC is likely to have devoted great resources and invested
large sums of taxpayer money in pursuing evidence that could
have been much more easily and cheaply obtained by deposing
the defendants. These investments were necessitated only by
the defendants' delay in coming forward. The defendants' invo-
cation of privilege took from the SEC the advantages of full
and mutual discovery. The Third Circuit failed to factor these
consequences into its remedy consideration.
Implicitly recognizing both the significance and the elu-
siveness of some of these advantages, the court in Gutierrez-
Rodriguez did not make any detailed assessment of the
strength of the opposition's case or of what was deprived by
the invocation. Instead, the court acted to eliminate even the
potential for prejudice inherent in a late waiver, stating that,
"it would be an abuse of the fifth amendment to allow [the de-
fendant] to claim the privilege... during discovery and con-
currently subject plaintiff to the possibility that at the eleventh
hour he might waive the privilege and testify at trial."21' Of-
ten, only forward-looking preclusion orders such as that in
Gutierrez-Rodriguez can remedy this potential for prejudice in-
herent in invocations of the self-incrimination privilege.2 6
22 SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 FR.D. 545, 549-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
213 Id. at 549.
214 Id. at 550.
21 Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 576 (1st Cir. 19S9) (empha-
sis added); see also notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
211 Fact-finders, whether judge or jury, may draw an adverse inference in civil
cases, Baxter v. Palmigiano 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1986), which may, to an extent,
remedy prejudice accruing to plaintiffs from invocation. In matters resolved at the
summary judgment stage by courts, like Graystone I, perhaps the adverse infer-
ence can provide an effective method of redress. Judges are well-equipped to gauge
1995]
BROOKLYN LAWREVAIEW
4. The Third Circuit's Mercy Motivations
a. Deference by the Court
The Graystone court seemed to accord the defendants the
kind of careful treatment usually reserved for defendants in
criminal cases. Two factors drove the court in Graystone: the
pro se nature of the defendants in the trial court proceedings,
and the government's concurrent control of the decision wheth-
er to initiate a parallel criminal action. Regarding the pro se
status of the defendants, Judge Weis opined that "[tihe deci-
sion to invoke or waive the Fifth Amendment is not always
self-evident, and it requires serious consideration of the conse-
quences." 11 He went on to note that "Itihe failure of Adams
and Ackerly to present proper legal arguments in response to
the motion for preclusion did not alert the district judge.., to
the factors that should be considered in directing an appropri-
ate remedy." 18 Regarding government control, Judge Weis
stated that "[clourts must bear in mind that when the govern-
ment is a party in a civil case and also controls the decision as
to whether criminal proceedings will be initiated, special con-
sideration must be given to the plight of the party asserting
prejudice and then choose between one or a combination of remedies.
There are, however, two problems with leaving prejudice to be balanced by
the adverse inference. First, not all matters will be resolved at the summary judg-
ment stage. Juries, unlike judges, may be misled due to inflamed passions or may
confuse the issues, as a result of a late waiver. Juries could be misled by long-
withheld testimony tailored to inflame their passions against and prejudice the op-
position. Preclusion insures against this.
Second, the adverse inference is imprecise, especially in comparison to pre-
clusion. The inference is both permissive only and variable in extent, on a case-by-
case basis. Preclusion is mandatory and by definition precisely coextensive with
the information withheld and the prejudice stemming from it. Juries may tend to
minimize the inference drawn when it stems from invocations prior to the testi-
mony offered at trial after late waiver, even though charged with applying it. The
effect of allowing trial testimony would be to make the prejudice stale. The preju-
dice could go unremedied. Judges, because of the nature of the inference, would be
forced to apply a remedy that may only awkwardly and amorphously suit the situ-
ation at hand. Moreover, due to the suspect nature of testimony following late
waivers, addressing reams of incredible testimony also may delay consideration of
dispositive motions. The adverse inference, while useful, is not a panacea for prej-
udice springing from assertions of the self-incrimination privilege.
217 Graystone 1, 25 F.3d at 193.
2 Id. at 194.
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the Fifth Amendment."219 With these factors in mind, the
court not only set out the points-waiver and prejudice-on
which "proper legal arguments" needed to be made on remand,
but also fit facts into the legal framework. Judge Weis essen-
tially dictated to the trial court, the closest judicial actor,"
that any remedy should be minimal. This conclusion is in no
way justified by the defendants' "plight."
The court essentially ruled out one solution commonly
advocated both by courts and commentators faced with discov-
ery avoidance: preclusion of defendants' testimony alone."
One commentator has stated categorically that "[clertainly, the
preclusion order should extend to the defendant's own testimo-
ny.2 This conclusion is appropriate because
[t]his is the precise information that the defendant withheld under
claim of privilege. It is only by preventing the defendant from
changing his mind after some reasonable period of time that the
plaintiff can be protected against unfair "sandbagging.:
Many other courts have agreed with this reasoning, and pre-
cluded defendant's testimony in similar situations. The
Graystone court's de facto rejection of this commonly applied
measure is indicative of its undue concern for the defendants.
219 Id. at 193-94.
220 The First Circuit characterized the trial court in this manner in Gutierrez-
Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 577 (deferring to the discretionary judgment of 'ta judicial
actor closest to the situation").
221 This differs from total preclusion, which would bar defendant from introduc-
ing any evidence, from any source, in support of denials and defenses on which
the privilege was invoked.
Fendler, supra note 17, at 1194.
Fendler, supra note 17, at 1194 (quoting Duffy v. Currier, 291 F. Supp. 810,
815 (D. Mfin. 1968)).
224 See, e.g., Rainier Natl Bank v. Hartstein, No. 91-36164, 1993 WL 175265
(9th Cir. May 25, 1993); In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304 (4th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Parcels of Land, 903 F.2cl 36 (1st Cir. 1990); Gutierrez-Rcdriguez v.
Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989); United, States v. Talco Contractors, Inc.,
153 F.,.D. 501 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); SEC v. Interlink Data Network, No. Civ.A. 93-
3073R, 1993 WL 603274 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 1993); United States v. Sixty Thou-




b. A Closer Look at The Graystone Defendants: Sophisticated
Businessmen, Pro Se by Choice
The defendants in Graystone have many advantages over
typical pro se defendants, and their pro se appearances are
most likely tactically motivated. In this case, judicial deference
is clearly unwarranted. After stating that the effects of privi-
lege invocation "depend to a large extent on the circumstances
of the particular litigation," Judge Weis made no detailed anal-
ysis of the defendants' circumstances. Instead, the court merely
noted, in a rather cautionary tone, that the defendants were
unrepresented.' The court's concession that the defendants
"had apparently received off-hand advice from lawyers at some
pointV" 6 is an understatement. These defendants are far re-
moved from the indigent, the undereducated and the unsophis-
ticated whom the court might justifiably protect.
The defendants received more than "off-hand advice from
lawyers." For example, Ackerly noted that "in the very begin-
ning, we were represented by counsel, both corporately and
individually." Similarly, Adams stated that he had invoked
the privilege for one year at the direction of Graystone's attor-
neys, until the attorneys informed him of their withdrawal
because a conflict had arisen after the present action was ini-
tiated.' Contrary to their protestations of non-representa-
tion, the defendants' respective answers all were printed in the
same format and font. Individual averments properly differen-
tiated between denials, denials of information and belief, and
partial admissions-altogether a very uniform and professional
job for three separate pro se defendants.' Ackerly further
stated that the defendants did not attend other depositions on
"' Graystone f, 25 F.3d at 192-93.
28 Id.
22 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 7.
22 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 12-13.
229 See Answers of Defendants Richard Adams, Thomas Ackerly and Vincent
Ackerly to Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, all dated November 20 or
21, 1991, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 1993). Even assuming that this
does not indicate extensive assistance of counsel, it surely indicates a level of so-
phistication and legal competence unworthy of the solicitousness of the court. See
infra text accompanying note 238 for a further discussion on this point.
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advice of counsel."3 Given this fact, one can draw a fair in-
ference that the defendants also would have sought and re-
ceived advice on how to proceed in their contemporaneous
depositions, and on the invocation of privilege. Lastly, the off-
hand advice to which the court referred was from "three former
prosecutors" who "branded" the defendants with the idea that
"you simply don't give testimony." This revelation not only
further indicates that the Graystone defendants had received
significant legal guidance and assistance, but also adds doubt
as to the defendants' lack of financial resources.'
Legal help often is costly. Defendants who can afford but
choose to forego legal representation, however, are less deserv-
ing of judicial protection than those who cannot afford it. Blan-
ket deference is not warranted for those who have a choice and
who, in choosing to appear pro se, worsen "the burden pro se
representation imposes upon extremely busy district judg-
es.' Disadvantaged and white-collar defendants typically
are not similarly situated regarding their ability to pay for
legal help. White collar defendants may have other consider-
ations in not retaining counsel.
The defendants in Graystone were not indigent and did not
need the special solicitousness of the court. Other Graystone
defendants had entered into consent judgments agreeing to
disgorge significant amounts of illicit gains.' Most notably,
1o Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 8.
2" Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 70, at 9.
It is possible that defendants received free legal advice. If they did not,
however, legal advice from "three former prosecutors" probably was expensive.
2' Graystone H, 25 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1994).
2"' Defendant Shawn M. Crane entered into a Consent Judgment for approxi-
mately $61,000; defendant Robert L. Rock entered into a judgment for
disgorgement of approximately $279,000. Graystone , 25 F.3d at 193. The court
noted that "[t]he amount of these judgments stand [sic] in stark contrast to the
approximately $60.5 million assessed against Adams and Acherly," id. at 193 n.2,
to further its portrayal of the 'plighet of these persecuted defendants, id. at 194.
This is misleading for a number of reasons. The $60.5 million figure request-
ed to be disgorged represents the total amount allegedly bilked from the public,
per SEC policy where the course of settlement negotiations have not convinced
regulators that such an amount is not 'recoverable or enforceable.7 Transcript of
Proceedings, supra note 70, at 6. Rock and Crane were relatively minor players
compared to Ackerly and Adams, who were among the top decisionmakers at the
firm. The judgments entered are the product of negotiations, and thus may not
reflect the true amount attributable to the minor defendants. Most importantly,
the court neglected to mention that there also was a default judgment entered for
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Dennis Williams, an Executive Vice President of Graystone
and operator of a number of franchise offices, agreed to dis-
gorge almost $14 million; the court noted that he had the "ap-
parent ability" to do so." Adams, also an Executive Vice
President, and Ackerly, President and Chairman of the Board
of Directors, were in an equal or greater position to profit from
the allegedly criminal activity. Casting more doubt upon the
poverty of the defendants is the fact that Adams, after losing
in the district court, retained counsel for his appeal. 6 While
it admittedly is unlikely that defendants would have received
appointed counsel had they applied, they made no application.
One motivation for foregoing the opportunity for appointed
counsel might have been the continued concealment of the kind
of illicit gains that their alleged cohorts had agreed to dis-
gorge,237 gains that they would have had to conceal by perjur-
ing themselves in their applications. These defendants simply
do not merit the same careful treatment accorded to the poor
and disadvantaged.
A final distinction remains. The defendants were experi-
enced executives in a major business enterprise. Admittedly,
businessmen are not lawyers. Nevertheless, they are not pris-
oners nor members of any other group worthy of increased
solicitousness due to their position. If anything, these defen-
dants were more prepared than the average layperson to com-
prehend, plan and execute a legal defense. The defendants ran
a complicated business.' They were its top managers and
policymakers, necessarily possessing deep and intimate knowl-
edge of the corporation's inner workings. When combined with
the indications of legal assistance and financial resources, the
sophistication of the Graystone defendants should have bred
increased wariness on the part of the Third Circuit, not in-
creased care.
another, more highly placed defendant, Dennis Williams-for disgorgement of al-
most $14 million. Moreover, the court noted that Williams had the apparent abili-
ty to disgorge this amount. See infra note 234 and accompanying text. All signs
point to the existence of at least sufficient financial resources to retain counsel.
' Order dated Dec. 11, 1992, Graystone I, 820 F. Supp. 863 (No. 91-4327).
2 Graystone I, 25 F.3d at 188.
" Alternatively, the defendants may have desired to conceal other assets unre-
lated to this action.
28 See supra notes 58-59 for a description of the scope of the business.
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c. The "Government" Is Not a Party
It is an oversimplification to assume that because the
government was a party in Graystone the defendants' "plight"
was worthy of enhanced judicial solicitousness. Granted, some
danger of baseless civil actions brought solely to compel testi-
mony from potential criminal defendants, or vice versa, ex-
ists. 9 Agency self-interest, however, along with the competi-
tion for resources among government arms such as the SEC
and the U.S. Attorney may significantly decrease this possibili-
ty. Moreover, in a properly founded action, the possibility and
ease of cooperation between agencies like the SEC and the
U.S. Attorney is a desirable by-product of the pursuit of legiti-
mate societal goals in a civil context. In addition, cooperation
is not a phenomenon limited to a coordinate arm of the govern-
ment and the U.S. Attorney. Private litigants bringing securi-
ties fraud actions, for example, also are likely to cooperate
with the U.S. Attorney when cooperation will aid in attain-
ment of their ends. This potential further disperses the air of
novelty from the SEC-as-plaintiff situation.
Congress has charged the SEC with the smooth running
and fair operation of securities markets. The SEC's resources,
=' There is a longstanding consensus that allowing maintenance of suits
brought solely to support others "would be flouting the policy of the law." United
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958). In Procter & Gamble,
defendants requested discovery and production of grand jury transcripts, partly
maintaining that the earlier, unsuccessful criminal indictment was baseless and
brought solely to aid the civil action. Id. On appeal the Supreme Court rejected
the request, stating that [t]here is no finding that the grand jury proceeding was
used as a shortcut to goals otherwise barred or more difficult to reach.' Id.; sce
also United States v. Pennsalt Chem. Corp., 260 F. Supp. 171, 180 (E). Pa. 1966)
(allowing discovery of the circumstances surrounding the investigation leading to a
civil suit, including the timing of a grand jury inquiry and of other events leading
to the suit, to support plaintiffs claim that a grand jury inquiry was made solely
to support the civil action); United States v. Thayer, 214 F. Supp. 929, 932 (D.
Colo. 1963). The court in Thayer granted defendant a new trial where defendant
was prosecuted for perjury for answers given during an SEC investigation of his
role in a sale of stock. The court stated that defendant "may have been misled by
the fact that the main object of the investigation appeared to be inquiry into sub-
stantive violations." Id. In fact, the court held the object of the investigation was
to cause the witness to perjure himself. Id. at 931. This holding has been cited




while formidable, are nonetheless finite. The budget process
allocates funding based in part on its availability, of course,
but is also dependent on the extent to which Congress per-
ceives the agency to be effective in implementing the congres-
sional mandate. The more successful the SEC is in recovering
disgorgement of illicit gains, enjoining fraudulent or unfair
practices in securities dealing, and otherwise fulfilling this
mandate, the more secure is its funding. Actions brought large-
ly to serve other agencies would tend to waste the SEC's finite
resources, as their initiation, typically, would not be a product
of an accurate assessment of the possibility of success redound-
ing to the SEC's benefit. These abusive actions, therefore, will
be exceptional. Moreover, the adverse publicity that could
result from unprincipled exercises of civil power at the bidding
of the criminal authorities could further harm the long-term
interests of the SEC.24 These factors indicate that concern
for testimonial compulsion in trumped-up cases is exaggerated
and not a worthy motivating factor for the Third Circuit to aid
the defendants in Graystone.
Some might argue that the greater ease and increased
possibility of cooperation with criminal prosecutors inherent in
any action brought by the SEC points toward greater safe-
guarding of fifth amendment rights. In a well-founded action
such cooperation is merely a favorable by-product of the
government's legitimate pursuit of important societal inter-
ests."' Certainly, the possibility exists that, even in an action
brought to serve the legitimate interests of an agency like the
SEC, information could be sought at the behest of another
agency that has no real bearing on the case at hand. Measures
"' This point, that bad publicity is both undesirable and harmful, is almost
self-evident, but difficult to prove. There do not appear to be any concrete exam-
pies. The coverage of one prominent case, however, shows a willingness by the
press to point out the possibility of government weakness rather than the over-
whelming evident strength of a case. See Martha M. Hamilton & David A. Vise,
Levine Defense Outlined: Attorneys Say SEC Shows No Evidence, WASH. POST, May
21, 1986, at GI. The implication in the title is that this is harassment-an SEC
fishing expedition. The claims of Levine's attorneys were set out in detail. Con-
versely, the reams of SEC evidence, and the defense attorney's efforts to gloss
over the evidence, are given only a few lines. One can only imagine the savaging
the government would receive if a truly questionable investigation or action was
uncovered.
21 See supra text at note 194 and text following note 197 for a discussion of
the interests served by SEC action.
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available to courts, however, such as protective orders or fur-
ther restrictions on discovery, effectively counteract this type of
abuse.
Finally, the considerable possibility of a private litigant's
cooperation with the U.S. Attorney removes the situation of
defendants like those in Graystone from the realm of the novel
and constitutionally dangerous. Claims similar to those in
Graystone could be brought as a class action. 2 With
disgorgement amounts in the millions of dollars, such actions
most likely would attract competent legal representation. 243 A
competent plaintiffs attorney, in marshalling resources for an
effort to extract a favorable settlement of such a case, certainly
would consider the possibility of cooperation with the U.S.
Attorney and would make the plaintiffs awareness of that
possibility clear to the defendants. Granted, cooperation would
not be as easy or seamless as that between two government
agencies; nevertheless, the danger to the defendant is compa-
rable in kind and only incrementally less in degree than that
present when the SEC is a party plaintiff. This difference in
degree does not support the type of favorable treatment the
Graystone defendants received from the Third Circuit, either
alone or in combination with their ostensibly unrepresented
status.
CONCLUSION: TOTAL AVOIDANCE SHOULD BRING TOTAL
PRECLUSION
The degree of preclusion in a given case should be tailored
to counterbalance the extent of the prejudice to opposing par-
ties caused by discovery avoidance. In situations where defen-
dants provide timely discovery on specific issues a lesser pre-
clusion order or other remedy may be appropriate. Selective
I See supra note 143 for a discussion of the various causes of action in this
case under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
Actions under §§ 11 and 12 (expressly) of the Securities Act, §§ 10(b) and 15(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder (implicdly)
may be brought privately. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 US.
128, 150-54 (1972) (Rule 10b-5).
24' Effective representation of class interests is a prerequisite to maintenance of




preclusion of evidence bearing on certain defenses, denials or
claims may ameliorate the effects of the shield of privilege on
discovery. Even in these cases, though, courts' efforts in a civil
context should be to avoid prejudice to any party, and decided-
ly not to subsidize a tactical distortion of the fair contest
through an invocation of the fifth amendment privilege.
Where discovery avoidance is total, however, despite the
difficulty of quantifying precisely the harmful effects of the
invocation, courts must effectively counteract these harmful
effects. Simply put, loss of the opportunities inherent in discov-
ery to improve its case or position prejudices a plaintiff even if
the defendant is not permitted to testify. The prejudice is far
greater if the testimony is allowed. The only way to ensure
that one invoking the privilege gains advantage from its use is
to totally preclude any factual support from any source for the
denials and defenses as to which that party has asserted the
privilege.
Total preclusion is a measured, proportionate remedy that
does not operate as an automatic deprivation, and therefore
does not fall into the category of "costly" sanctions proscribed
by the Supreme Court. It is not a reflexive measure taken as a
result of a lack of "careful evaluation."244 Rather, total preclu-
sion is a solution that both takes into account the manifold
substantive and procedural interests present in civil actions
such as Graystone, and embodies a realistic estimate of the
prejudice imposed on civil litigants who use the self-incrimi-
nation privilege to stonewall discovery. Courts have an obliga-
tion to prevent imbalances from tainting a civil trial. Total
preclusion is the permissible remedy that is most sure to coun-
teract the level and type of prejudice inherent in cases of total
avoidance. It is a fair and proper price of, not a penalty for, the
invocation of the Fifth Amendment in a civil case.
Christopher V. Blum
"4 Graystone II, 25 F.3d at 192 (characterizing the remedy in FTC v. Kitco of
Nev., Inc., 615 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Minm. 1985), as a product of careful evaluation
and opposing it to the total preclusion in SEC v. Cymaticolor Corp., 106 F.R.D.
545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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